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Abstract 
Community notification statutes, popularly known as “Megan’s Law,” were 
passed in rapid succession throughout the United States (US) following the 
enactment of landmark legislation in the state of Washington in 1990. Calls for the 
adoption of similar legislation in Australia gained momentum following the 
introduction of “limited disclosure” schemes in the United Kingdom (UK) and, in 
2012, one Australian state became the first jurisdiction in Australasia to introduce 
community notification. The three-tiered scheme that was introduced incorporates 
elements of both the U.S. and U.K. models of notification.  
The overarching aim of this thesis was to examine the perspectives and 
implementation experiences of the police who are responsible for administering the 
scheme. Three standalone but related articles are presented. The first is a review of 
the relevant international literature, most of which emanates from the US. This 
review is provided in order to contextualise the introduction of the scheme that is the 
subject of this thesis and to highlight how international developments have informed 
the development of this policy in Australia.  
The aim of the first empirical study was to explore police officers’ 
expectations and concerns in relation to the introduction of the community 
notification scheme. In-depth interviews were conducted with 21 specialist police 
officers drawn from a squad that is responsible for coordinating the ongoing 
management, registration, and monitoring of sex offenders who live in the 
community, as well as administering the community notification scheme. Systematic 
thematic analysis revealed that the police officers who were interviewed were 
concerned that the policy would not achieve its intended objectives, and that it could 
	 iv 
potentially adversely impact offenders, the community at large, and/or the police 
agency.  
The aim of the second empirical study was to investigate whether the major 
concerns identified in the first study had, in fact, been realised. This study integrated 
an analysis of the in-depth interviews conducted with the police with an analysis of 
some limited outcome data, which was used to either corroborate or disconfirm the 
police officers’ expectations. The analysis provided little evidence that the concerns 
voiced by police in relation to the introduction of community notification had come 
to fruition. 
This research makes a modest, but nonetheless important, contribution to the 
literature. It provides the first exploration of police officer perspectives of a 
community notification scheme operating outside of the US or UK. The primary 
value of this type of research lies in its potential to inform the effective design and 
implementation of community notification in similar jurisdictions. This is timely 
given the interest of other Australian jurisdictions, and in New Zealand, of adopting 
similar legislation. Policy and practice implications are discussed, and suggestions 
for future research are offered.  
	 1 
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
In 2012, Western Australia (WA) became the first jurisdiction in Australia to 
enact legislation1 that allows personal details about convicted sex offenders to be 
released to the general public (Trenwith, 2012); what is commonly referred to as 
“community notification.” This fulfilled an election commitment made by the state 
government (then in opposition) in response to sustained community campaigning 
following the sexually motivated murder of an 8-year-old girl in a suburban shopping 
centre in the state’s capital in 2006 (Eliot, 2010; Spagnolo, 2011a, 2011b; “Website 
names and shames,” 2012). The then state Attorney-General, Christian Porter, 
declared that the enactment of this legislation was “a clear win for the people of WA 
and the rights of parents to be able to access information that may protect their 
children from sex offenders in their community” (Trenwith, 2012, para. 10); a 
statement that both reflects the underlying intent of the legislation and acknowledges 
the power of community pressure in driving this type of legislation. In this case, the 
victim’s parents had been instrumental in mobilising community support for the 
introduction of a publicly accessible sex offender register (Campbell, 2016; Eliot, 
2010). 
Public fear and outrage in response to highly publicised sex crimes against 
children has been a common impetus for the introduction of similar laws around the 
western world (Levenson, 2003; Petrunik, 2003; Thomas, 2004a, 2011; Thompson & 
Greek, 2010). Indeed, the main catalyst for the passage of the very first community 
notification statute was the particularly brutal sexual assault of a 7-year-old boy by a 
convicted sex offender in Tacoma, Washington State in 1989 (Petrunik, 2003; 
																																																						
1Community Protection (Offender Reporting) Amendment Act of 2012 (WA) 
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Thomas, 2011). The following year, in response to extensive media coverage and 
significant public pressure, the Washington State Legislature enacted a landmark 
piece of legislation2, which included community notification provisions (see 
Thomas, 2011, for a detailed review of the background to the drafting of this 
legislation). The rapid introduction of similar legislation in other states was also 
often precipitated by tragic events. In 1994, for example, the State of New Jersey 
passed “Megan’s Law” just three months after 7-year-old Megan Kanka was 
murdered by a convicted sex offender who, unbeknownst to Megan’s parents, lived 
in the same street as the family (Levenson, 2003; Petrunik, 2003). The New Jersey 
statute became a blueprint for federal legislation passed in 1996, which mandated 
that all states adopt community notification or else face funding cuts (Levenson, 
2003; Petrunik, 2003; Thomas, 2011; Thompson & Greek, 2010).  
Collectively, United States (U.S.) federal and state community notification 
statutes have come to be known as “Megan’s Law.” Stout, Kemshall, and Wood 
(2011) have noted that the use of the term “law” (rather than “laws”) in this context 
is somewhat misleading given that there is, in practice, significant variation between 
the states in how they have responded to the federal mandate. Notwithstanding the 
2006 passage of the federal Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act which was, 
in part, an attempt to introduce greater uniformity among the states, marked 
differences exist in how these laws have been implemented (Ackerman, Harris, 
Levenson, & Zgoba, 2011; Harris & Lobanov-Rostovsky, 2016). Adam Walsh was a 
6-year-old boy who, in 1981, was abducted and murdered by a convicted serial killer 
(Thomas, 2011).  
																																																						
2Community Protection Act of 1990 
	 3 
There are numerous other examples of U.S. state and federal statutes being 
named after (predominantly child) victims (e.g., Indiana’s Zachary’s Law and the 
federal Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent Offender 
Registration Act, both of which were passed in 1994), reflecting the moral panic 
engendered by sex crimes against children and the emotionally charged nature of the 
development of public policy in relation to this issue. The prominence of victims’ 
names in the discourse surrounding legislative reform in this area is significant 
because, as Logan (2009) has observed, this form of personalisation effectively 
inoculates the legislation against challenge. As Logan notes, “opponents risk…being 
portrayed as being ‘soft on criminals,’ potentially leaving them responsible for any 
subsequent victimisation” (p. 94). As a result, legislation in this area has often been 
drafted with a sense of urgency and passed unanimously, without meaningful debate 
(Logan, 2011). 
 In the United Kingdom (UK), the abduction and murder of 8-year-old Sarah 
Payne by Roy Whiting in 2000 led to a fierce media driven campaign for Megan’s 
Law to be introduced (see Thomas, 2011, for a discussion of this campaign). The 
campaign for “Sarah’s Law” was instigated by the Sunday newspaper the News of 
the World, which published the names and photographs of known sex offenders and 
incited the public to agitate for open access to the sex offender register held by law 
enforcement ("Named, shamed," 2000; "Sign here for Sarah," 2000). The ensuing 
hysteria led to public demonstrations and disorder in parts of the UK, which was 
reported to result in many offenders – and those wrongly identified as such – being 
driven out of their homes and in some cases physically attacked (Dodd, 2000; 
Herbert, 2000). 
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The Home Office resisted sustained media and community pressure for 
public access to the sex offender register; however, in a move to conciliate the 
public, amendments to the Criminal Justice and Courts Services Bill3 were 
introduced that strengthened existing registration provisions4 (see Thomas, 2004a, 
2004b, for an explanation of these amendments). The following year, in response to 
renewed pressure following Roy Whiting’s conviction and sentencing and the 
revelation that he had previously been convicted of a child sex offence, the Home 
Office announced an intention to appoint lay advisors to Multi-Agency Public 
Protection Panels (MAPPPs), which are convened to discuss and review the 
management of high-risk sexual and violent offenders who live in the community 
(Kemshall, 2008; Thomas, 2004a; for a discussion of MAPPPs, see Maguire & 
Kemshall, 2004; see also Thomas, 2004b, 2011). This was viewed as an attempt to 
quell public outrage whilst averting demands for public access to the register 
(Kemshall, 2008; Thomas, 2004a, 2004b, 2011).  
Demands for greater public access to the register periodically resurfaced in 
the years that followed, up until the release of the Review of the Protection of 
Children From Sex Offenders report (Home Office, 2007), which heralded a change 
in government policy. The report identified 20 actions which had the shared aim of 
improving the management of child sex offenders; among them was a presumption 
that relevant authorities would disclose information about convicted child sex 
offenders to members of the public where a risk of serious harm to children was 
identified. This represented a departure from the practice of “discretionary 
disclosure” that had existed for some time – prior to the introduction of the sex 
																																																						
3These are subsumed in Schedule 5 of the Criminal Justice and Court Services Act (2000). 
 
4Pursuant to the Sex Offenders Act (1997). 
	 5 
offenders’ register (established under the Sex Offenders Act of 1997) and Sarah’s 
Law campaign. 
Among the actions proposed in the report was the introduction of a pilot 
scheme in which members of the public could register a child protection interest in a 
named individual. Subsequently, a pilot scheme was introduced in four police force 
areas of England (see Kemshall & Wood, 2010; see also Kemshall, Dominey, & 
Hilder, 2011; Kemshall, Kelly, & Wilkinson, 2012; Kemshall & Weaver, 2012; Stout 
et al., 2011), with Scotland introducing its own pilot program shortly thereafter (see 
Chan, Homes, Murray, & Treanor, 2010). These schemes allowed parents and 
guardians5 to enquire about a particular individual who had unsupervised contact 
with their child or children and where warranted, empowered police to disclose to the 
applicant that the person of concern was a registered sex offender. The pilots were 
hailed a success and the scheme was subsequently rolled out across England, Wales, 
and Scotland (Kemshall & Weaver, 2012). 
The community notification scheme that was introduced four years ago in 
WA was modelled on both the U.S. and U.K. systems of notification (see below for a 
description of the scheme). It is, at present, the only community notification scheme 
operating in Australasia, although its introduction has led to calls for community 
notification gaining momentum in other Australian jurisdictions and in New Zealand. 
In 2014, for example, an elected parliamentarian in Queensland attempted to 
introduce a similar scheme but the private member’s bill failed to garner the support 
of the two major political parties and was voted down (Rebgetz & Agius, 2014). In 
the same year, however, the Northern Territory (NT) Government announced its 
																																																						
5The English (and, following its roll-out, Welsh) scheme was later expanded to allow anyone with a 
child protection concern about a named child to make an application (Kemshall et al., 2012). 
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intention to introduce a bill into parliament that, if passed, would see the introduction 
of more extensive community notification akin to the public sex offender registers 
that exist in the US (Davidson & Chan, 2014; Elferink, 2015; Purtill & Dorsett, 
2014). The bill was named “Daniel’s Law”6 in honour of Daniel Morcombe, a 13-
year-old boy from Queensland who was abducted and murdered by a convicted child 
sex offender on parole in 2003 (Elferink, 2015; Purtill & Dorsett, 2014). Daniel’s 
disappearance attracted widespread and sustained media attention and was reportedly 
“the biggest police investigation in Queensland’s history and Australia’s biggest 
missing persons case” (Norton, 2014, "Cowan's Criminal History," para. 20).  
Daniel’s parents, Bruce and Denise Morcombe, established the Daniel 
Morcombe Foundation in 2005, its mission being to “maintain public attention on 
Daniel’s disappearance [prior to Brett Peter Cowan being charged with, and 
convicted of, Daniel’s murder some years later], educate children about personal 
safety and keeping safe, and assisting child victims of crime” (Butt, 2016, para. 2). A 
major initiative of the Foundation is the campaign for Daniel’s Law to be introduced 
nationwide (Butt, 2016). The NT bill was seen as a first step towards this goal 
(Davidson, 2015; Purtill & Dorsett, 2014). Bruce and Denise Morcombe were 
present for the initial press conference in which the then NT Attorney-General, John 
Elferink, announced that the bill would be tabled, as well as for the first and second 
readings of the bill in parliament (Davidson, 2015; Oaten, 2016; Purtill & Dorsett, 
2014).  
Daniel’s Law proved to be very divisive and a number of prominent 
individuals and bodies voiced strong opposition; including the then Prime Minister 
																																																						
6The full title of the bill is the Sex Offender and Child Homicide Offender Public Website (Daniel’s 
Law) Bill.  
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of Australia Tony Abbott, members of the parliamentary opposition, the NT 
Criminal Lawyers Association and Law Society, and victim advocacy groups 
(Davidson, 2015; Davidson & Chan, 2014; Oaten, 2016; Purtill & Dorsett, 2014; 
Terzon, 2015a, 2015b). Various concerns were raised about the lack of evidence that 
such laws “work,” the increased risk of vigilantism, the possible identification of 
victims, and potential to discourage victims from reporting abuse (Davidson & Chan, 
2014; Oaten, 2016; Purtill & Dorsett, 2014; Terzon, 2015b). In addition, other state 
governments did not support the proposal and indicated that they would refuse 
requests for access to their data due to privacy concerns (Davidson, 2015; Dunlop, 
2015; Terzon, 2015a). A major criticism was the lack of consultation that took place 
prior to the bill being tabled in parliament (Davidson, 2015; Oaten, 2016). In 
response, the government withdrew the bill from parliament in December 2015 to 
allow further consultation, with public forums commencing the following month 
(Oaten, 2016; Walsh, 2016). A general NT election held in August 2016 saw a 
change of government (La Canna, 2016), making it even less likely the legislation 
will be passed in its current form. 
Derryn Hinch, a media personality and prominent public figure in Australia, 
has been a strong – and vocal – supporter of Daniel’s Law. The self-proclaimed 
“human headline” ("About Hinch," 2014) has spent five months under home 
detention and served two brief jail sentences for contempt of court for breaching 
suppression orders and related offences by publicly identifying sex offenders and 
revealing details of their past convictions (Koziol, 2016; McGrath, 2014; Smith, 
2016). In 2014, upon his release from a prison in regional Victoria, he embarked on a 
10-day, 180 kilometre walk to Victoria’s Parliament House to present a petition 
signed by nearly 130,000 people calling for a national public sex offender register 
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(Jefferson, 2014; McGrath, 2014)7. The following year, he formed his own political 
party, Derryn Hinch’s Justice Party, and was subsequently elected to the Australian 
Senate in July 2016 (Koziol, 2016; Smith, 2016). The Justice Party’s key policy 
agenda is the introduction of Daniel’s Law (Derryn Hinch's Justice Party, 2016), and 
Hinch has vowed to continue to campaign for this until it is passed at both the state 
and federal levels (Skinner, 2016). In his maiden speech in parliament he called for a 
national public sex offender register and delivered on his promise to use 
parliamentary privilege to “name and shame” child sex offenders whose names had 
been suppressed by the courts; a move which attracted significant media attention 
and controversy (Butler, 2016; “Derryn Hinch uses parliamentary privilege,” 2016; 
Hutchens, 2016; Remeikis, 2016; Timms, 2016). Being a veteran journalist and 
broadcaster, Hinch is well-versed in making headlines, and since he assumed office 
there has been renewed interest and debate around a national public sex offender 
register (Skinner, 2016). It is in this context that this thesis was completed. 
 
Description of the Western Australian Scheme 
The legislation passed in WA that provided the legal foundation for the 
introduction of community notification, the Community Protection (Offender 
Reporting) Amendment Act of 2012 (henceforth the “2012 Act”), amended the 
existing Community Protection (Offender Reporting) Act of 2004 (henceforth the 
“2004 Act”). The 2004 Act introduced a statewide sex offender register and made it 
a requirement that offenders convicted of certain sexual or other serious “reportable” 
																																																						
7The petition has now amassed 160,000 signatures (Skinner, 2016; Smith, 2016). Details of the 
petition can be found on the Justice Party’s website: http://www.justiceparty.com.au/#!public-register-
convicted-sex-offenders/z2xra 
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offences (such as murder, manslaughter, and the abduction or kidnapping of a child)8 
must register their personal details with the police within seven days of their release 
into the community from custody or court, and report to the police at regular, pre-
determined intervals (at least annually). The 2004 Act also made it a requirement that 
reportable offenders update the police with any changes in their personal 
circumstances, including their living arrangements, employment status, relationship 
status, club or organisation membership, vehicles owned or regularly driven, carriage 
service providers, email addresses, and online user profiles. Failure to comply with 
reporting obligations can result in imprisonment.  
The period for which an offender is subject to these requirements is 
dependent on: the seriousness of the offence (there are three different offence 
classes); whether s/he has prior convictions for reportable offences; and his/her age 
(i.e., whether s/he is a juvenile or an adult). The initial reporting period for adult 
offenders is either eight years (for a Class 2 offence) or 15 years (for a Class 1 
offence or two Class 3 offences). Reportable offenders who go on to commit a 
further reportable offence are subject to these requirements for life (for a more 
detailed explanation of reporting requirements, see Vess, Langskaill, Day, Powell, & 
Graffam, 2011). 
Prior to the passage of the 2012 Act, information held in the sex offender 
register could only be released with the Police Minister’s written authorisation. The 
2012 Act introduced provision for the controlled and limited release of information 
to the general public. It stipulates the strict conditions under which information may 
be released and to whom these provisions apply. A specialist police squad formed in 
																																																						
8The list of reportable offences includes sexual and other serious offences against a child, as well as 
select serious sexual offences against an adult and serious non-sexual offences against an adult where 
the individual has prior convictions of a similar nature.  
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2006 with responsibility for coordinating the ongoing management, registration, and 
monitoring of all reportable offenders administers the scheme, which came into 
effect seven months after the passage of the 2012 Act, with the launch of the 
Community Protection Website (https://www.communityprotection.wa.gov.au) in 
October 2012. The state government committed $2.9 million to implement the 
scheme and a further $1.4 million towards its ongoing administration and operating 
costs (Government of Western Australia, 2012). 
This three-tiered scheme incorporates elements of both the U.S. and U.K. 
models of notification (see Appendix A for the description of the scheme that is 
published on the website). The first tier pertains to reportable offenders who have 
failed to comply with their reporting obligations or who have provided false or 
misleading information and whose whereabouts are unknown to the police. The 
name, date of birth, gender, physical description and photograph of such offenders 
are published on an online “missing offenders register” that can be viewed by the 
general public (see Appendix B for the description that is published on the website). 
The photograph and details of missing offenders are promptly removed from the 
website upon police locating them. As such, only a small number of offenders are 
published on the missing offenders register at any one time. As at September 2016, 
the details of 12 individuals were published on the register. 
The second tier allows residents of the state to perform a search that returns 
the photographs of any dangerous or high-risk offenders residing in the same locality 
(i.e., the same town or suburb or an adjoining suburb; see Appendix C for the 
description that is published on the website). The specific criteria are restrictive and 
capture only a small proportion (less than 5%) of reportable offenders; those 
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classified as a Dangerous Sexual Offender pursuant to the relevant legislation9 and 
serious repeat offenders (i.e., reportable offenders who have committed further sex 
offences). In addition, the photograph of any offender convicted of a serious offence 
(including non-sexual offences) may be published at the discretion of the 
Commissioner of Police and Minister for Police if the offender is deemed to pose a 
serious risk to public safety that warrants disclosure. Offenders who meet the tier two 
eligibility criteria are given advanced notice in writing and there is a formal process 
through which they can appeal the decision to publish their photograph. Anyone 
wishing to conduct a “local search” must provide their personal details and verify 
their identity before proceeding. All photographs of offenders that are revealed 
through a local search are watermarked with the name of the person who performed 
the search, enabling the source of illegally reproduced photographs to be traced. The 
legislation stipulates that all offenders subject to notification pursuant to tier two 
must have an “extraction plan” in place, to be followed in the event of a vigilante 
attack. 
The third tier, the “disclosure scheme,” was modelled on the limited 
disclosure schemes that exist in the UK, and allows parents and guardians to enquire 
whether a particular individual who has regular10 unsupervised contact with their 
child or children is a reportable offender (see Appendix D for the description 
published on the website). The police assess each application (see Appendix E) and, 
where the person of concern is found to be a reportable offender, make a 
determination as to whether disclosure is warranted. Disclosure of information must 
be authorised by the Commissioner of Police and applicants are advised that they are 
																																																						
9Dangerous Sexual Offenders Act of 2006 (WA) 
 
10Defined as at least three days of unsupervised contact with the child or children in any 12-month 
period. 
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not permitted to share any information provided by the police with others, or else 
they may face possible criminal charges.  
The 2012 Act criminalised vigilantism by introducing two new offences. The 
more serious offence – engaging in conduct intended to create, promote or increase 
animosity towards, or harassment of, an identified offender – carries a maximum 
penalty of 10 years’ imprisonment, while the less serious offence – engaging in 
conduct that is likely to create, promote or increase animosity towards, or harassment 
of, an identified offender – carries a maximum penalty of two years’ imprisonment. 
A number of measures were introduced to minimise the risk of vigilantism, including 
a requirement that users must accept terms of agreement outlining the penalties for 
the two vigilante offences before viewing the missing offenders register, conducting 
a local search, or submitting a tier three application (see Appendix F).  
 
Rationale and Aims of the Thesis  
 The issue of a public sex offender register has received considerable attention 
at both the state and federals level in Australia, and yet very little empirical research 
has been undertaken in this area. In one of the few previous Australian studies 
related to this topic, Powell, Day, Benson, Vess, and Graffam (2014) conducted 
focus groups with police officers (N = 24) across three different Australian 
jurisdictions to explore their perceptions of the sex offender registration schemes that 
operate in every state and territory. These focus groups were, however, undertaken 
between 2009 and 2010 – prior to the introduction of community notification in any 
Australian jurisdiction. Whilst not the focus of this study, participants independently 
raised a number of concerns regarding the possibility of making registry information 
publicly available, including: that it would place an additional burden on police 
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resources; that it would reduce offender compliance and increase the risk of 
reoffending; and that it would discourage victims of intra-familial sexual abuse from 
reporting. These concerns are investigated further in this thesis in light of the police 
force of the state that introduced the first – and currently only – community 
notification scheme in Australia was reported to be opposed to the new laws (Eliot, 
2010). Prior to the passage of the legislation, the state Police Commissioner also 
voiced concerns about vigilantism and the possible negative impact on offender 
compliance, warning that evidence from the US indicated that the introduction of 
similar laws across the US would drive offenders “underground” (Eliot, 2010). This 
contrasts with US studies which have generally concluded that law enforcement 
officers are largely supportive of community notification (the findings of this body of 
research are discussed in further detail in Whitting, Day, & Powell, 2016; Chapter 3). 
This underscores the importance of more fully understanding the views of police 
officers. Furthermore, there are several other factors that might suggest that the 
findings of international research may not be directly generalisable to the Australian 
context. These are discussed next. 
 Firstly, the design of the Australian scheme is unique insofar as it is an 
amalgamation of schemes introduced in the US and UK. Speaking to the press the 
week the bill was introduced in parliament, the then state Attorney-General, 
Christian Porter, explained, “we have borrowed models that have operated 
successfully in the US and in the UK and we have put in a hybrid system” 
(Spagnolo, 2011a, para. 13). Notwithstanding the fact that the success of community 
notification schemes has been the subject of some debate (see Whitting, Day, & 
Powell, 2014; Chapter 2), to assume that a policy that has been shown to be effective 
in one context will be effective in another would appear to be somewhat misguided 
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(see Pawson, 2006b; Chapter 5). Secondly, related to this, although there are cultural 
similarities between Australia and other western countries, there are also important 
socio-political and cultural differences, including those that exist within Australia 
between the states/territories, counties/districts, and local government areas. The 
review of the international literature presented in Chapter 2 reveals a range of 
findings about effectiveness, most likely resulting from differences at the local level 
in the wording of the relevant legislation, associated policies and practices, and wider 
contextual factors. These differences highlight the need for a rigorous review of any 
new policy at the jurisdictional level.  
There has been no previous Australian research specifically on this topic and 
this thesis aims to make an important contribution to current knowledge by exploring 
the perspectives of those police officers who are responsible for managing the 
scheme. Although this does not represent an outcome evaluation (which is not 
feasible given the number of offenders involved, the lack of a suitable comparison 
group, and the limited follow-up time available), the value of this type of study lies 
in its potential to inform the successful implementation of community notification. 
The findings of this research will thus hopefully be of value to legislators, 
policymakers, and those charged with implementing similar policies in other 
jurisdictions. Furthermore, the findings may also be of interest to researchers, and 
should be considered when designing and interpreting the results of any future 
outcome evaluation of this scheme and other similar schemes.  
 
Structure of the Thesis  
 This thesis is formatted according to the university’s requirements for thesis 
by publication. The following three chapters are standalone but related articles, all of 
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which have been accepted for publication in peer-reviewed journals. Each chapter is 
presented as it appears in the journal, preceded by a brief introductory paragraph. 
Due to the format of thesis by publication, some repetition was unavoidable.  
Chapter 2 provides a review of the relevant international literature (most of 
which emanates from the US), which was published in the Australian and New 
Zealand Journal of Criminology (see Whitting et al., 2014). The review begins by 
describing what is meant by the term “community notification” and goes on to 
outline the rationale for its implementation. It then considers the impact of 
community notification on offender reintegration into the community and their 
subsequent risk of reoffending, its potential deterrent effect, its usefulness as a 
management tool, and implementation issues. This review is provided in order to 
contextualise the introduction of the scheme that is the subject of this thesis and to 
highlight how international developments have informed the development of this 
policy in Australia.  
 Chapter 3 presents the first empirical study – a qualitative exploration of 
police officers’ perceptions of the community notification scheme. This study, which 
has been accepted for publication in the International Journal of Police Science and 
Management (see Whitting et al., 2016), presents an analysis of in-depth interviews 
with 21 police officers drawn from a squad that is responsible for coordinating the 
ongoing management, registration, and monitoring of sex offenders residing in the 
community, as well as managing the community notification scheme. The analysis 
concentrated on identifying and coding participants’ expectations and concerns – 
what they anticipated would occur – rather than their observations regarding the 
actual impact of the scheme. The results of this study guided the focus of the second 
empirical study presented in Chapter 4.  
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 The second empirical study presented in Chapter 4 builds on the first study 
presented in the preceding chapter. This study, which has been accepted for 
publication in the journal of Psychiatry, Psychology and Law (see Whitting, Day, & 
Powell, in press), sought to better understand the impact of the scheme from the 
perspective of the police who have been responsible for its administration, and more 
specifically, to determine whether their main concerns reported in the first study had 
been realised. This study integrates an analysis of the in-depth interviews conducted 
with police officers with an analysis of official quantitative and qualitative data about 
the use of community notification provided by the police agency. 
The concluding chapter (Chapter 5) aims to draw together the main findings 
of this body of research, considers policy and practice implications arising from 
these findings, discusses limitations and identifies useful directions for future 
research. 
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CHAPTER 2: REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
 
 This chapter reviews the international literature in relation to the impact of 
community notification. This review, entitled “The Impact of Community 
Notification on the Management of Sex Offenders in the Community: An Australian 
Perspective,” has been published in the Australian and New Zealand Journal of 
Criminology (see Whitting, Day, & Powell, 2014)11. This review informed the 
development and interpretation of the results of the two empirical studies presented 
in Chapters 3 and 4. 
In 2012, Western Australia (WA) passed legislation providing for the 
disclosure of information about convicted sex offenders to the general public. This 
legislation fulfilled an election commitment made in response to continued 
community lobbying following the sexually motivated murder of 8-year-old Sofia 
Rodriguez-Urrutia Shu in a suburban shopping centre in Perth in 2006 (Trenwith, 
2012). Sofia’s parents were instrumental in mobilizing community support for a 
publicly accessible sex offender register to be introduced (Spagnolo, 2011b). 
Public outcry in response to high-profile sex crimes against children has been 
a common driving force behind the enactment of similar legislation in other countries 
(Levenson, 2003; Petrunik, 2003; Thompson and Greek, 2010). Community 
notification statutes currently exist in the United States (US), South Korea, the 
United Kingdom (UK), a few Canadian provinces, and now in WA (Logan, 2011; 
Vess et al., 2012). Although WA is, at present, the only jurisdiction in Australasia to 
have adopted this policy, other jurisdictions in Australia and New Zealand are likely 
																																																						
11Full citation: Whitting, L., Day, A., & Powell, M. (2014). The impact of community notification on 
the management of sex offenders in the community: An Australian perspective. Australian and New 
Zealand Journal of Criminology, 47, 240-258. doi: 10.1177/0004865813503349. Note the formatting 
of this chapter is consistent with the journal’s specifications. 
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to be monitoring its progress closely. In the US, community notification statutes 
were passed in rapid succession across the country after the state of Washington 
enacted landmark legislation in 1990 (Lasher and McGrath, 2012; Petrunik, 2003). 
As such, it is timely to review the current evidence base in relation to the impact of 
community notification policies on the management of sex offenders who reside in 
the community. 
This review begins by describing what is meant by the term “community 
notification” and outlining the rationale for its implementation. It then considers the 
impact of community notification on offenders’12 reintegration into the community 
and their subsequent risk of reoffending, its potential deterrent effect, its usefulness 
as a management tool, and implementation issues. This discussion identifies several 
factors that potentially moderate the effectiveness of community notification 
schemes in enhancing public safety. The paper concludes with some directions for 
future research and suggests a fruitful line of inquiry that may usefully inform the 
development of policy and practice in this area. 
 
What is Community Notification? 
Community notification, or “Megan’s Law” as it is commonly known in the 
US13, or “Sarah’s Law” in the UK14, takes many different forms but essentially 
																																																						
12It should be noted that whilst juvenile sex offenders may be subjected to notification requirements, 
this review focuses on the impact of these laws on adult sex offenders (including juveniles who are 
treated as adults before the law) as the requirements imposed on juveniles generally differ to those 
imposed on adults. 
 
13 Both New Jersey’s community notification statute passed in 1994 and the US federal legislation 
enacted in 1996 are named in honour of 7-year-old Megan Kanka who was tragically raped and 
murdered by a convicted sex offender who, unbeknownst to Megan’s parents, lived across the road 
from their NJ home (Thompson and Greek, 2010). 
 
14The UK legislation is popularly known as “Sarah’s Law”, memorializing 8-year-old Sarah Payne 
who was tragically abducted and murdered by a convicted sex offender (Dean, 2000).  
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involves the systematic disclosure of information about convicted sex offenders who 
reside in the community to members of the public (Finn, 1997). It may be proactive 
in the sense that information is routinely disseminated to the public (as is the case in 
the US and South Korea), or reactive, insofar as formal mechanisms exist through 
which enquiries may be made, and it is these enquiries that trigger the release of 
information (as in the UK; Finn, 1997; Logan, 2011). The UK scheme is much more 
limited than the US and South Korean schemes, as only those who have a concern 
about a particular individual who has contact with a child or children for whom they 
have caretaking responsibilities are able to lodge an enquiry (Kemshall and Weaver, 
2012).  
When community notification laws first came into effect in the US in the 
1990s, typical methods of notification included issuing press releases, displaying 
posters in public places, distributing flyers to each household in the area via post or 
in person, and convening community meetings (Lasher and McGrath, 2012; 
Levenson and Cotter, 2005; Thompson and Greek, 2010). Since Internet access has 
become widespread, and with the enactment of federal legislation mandating that the 
information be made available online, these more resource-intensive methods have 
become less common, although they are still utilized in some jurisdictions 
(Appelbaum, 2008; Levenson et al., 2007). The information that is published on 
official websites varies from state to state, but may include an offender’s name, their 
date of birth, residential address, place of employment, drivers license number, a 
description of their motor vehicle including the license plate number, details of past 
convictions, a physical description and photograph (Tewksbury and Jennings, 2010; 
Thompson and Greek, 2010). Similar information is published on a website 
maintained by the South Korean government (Shin and Lee, 2005). However, in 
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contrast to the US, where information is typically released on an ad hoc basis, in 
South Korea, information is released biannually and only remains on the website for 
a six-month period (Shin and Lee, 2005). There is considerable variability 
throughout the US with respect to the period of time information about an offender is 
to remain on the website, but lifetime registration appears to be increasingly common 
(Appelbaum, 2008; Logan, 2011).  
There is also marked variation in the scope of the laws in relation to whom 
they are applied to. Even within the US, there are no accepted criteria defining who 
should be subject to notification, with some states employing an inclusive definition 
that captures all persons who have been convicted of any offense of a sexual nature 
(including non-contact offenses, such as possessing child pornography), and others 
subjecting only those convicted of particular types of sex offenses involving children 
to notification requirements (Thompson and Greek, 2010). About half of the states 
take offense history (and often other factors) into consideration when determining 
the appropriate manner and extent of notification, reserving more aggressive forms 
of notification and/or more extensive disclosure for those convicted of more serious 
offenses (Lasher and McGrath, 2012; Levenson and Cotter, 2005; Levenson et al., 
2007).  
 
What is the Rationale for Community Notification?  
The ostensible aim of community notification is to increase public safety 
(Levenson and Cotter, 2005). Proponents of community notification claim it serves 
both a specific and a general deterrent function. Specific deterrence in this context 
refers to the law’s presumed reductive effect on the recidivism rate of convicted sex 
offenders who are subject to notification requirements (Drake and Aos, 2009). 
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Discussion of the specific deterrent effect of community notification has traditionally 
focused on the potential deterrent effect of increased surveillance. Advocates argue 
that increased surveillance of known sex offenders through improved public 
awareness and vigilance reduces risk of reoffending (Vásquez et al., 2008; Vess et 
al., 2011). Of course, this argument assumes that members of the community, armed 
with the knowledge that there is a sex offender living nearby, will engage in 
protective behaviors that prevent victimization. Available empirical evidence does 
not, however, provide unequivocal support for this assumption. Although some 
studies have found that community members are generally more safety-conscious 
and more likely to take precautionary measures to minimize the threat of 
victimization as a result of learning that a convicted sex offender lives nearby (e.g. 
Lieb and Nunlist, 2008; Phillips, 1998; Simpson Beck and Travis, 2004; Simpson 
Beck et al., 2004), others have concluded that community notification does not lead 
to any appreciable behavioral change (e.g. Anderson and Sample, 2008; Caputo and 
Brodsky, 2004). Indeed, it has even been suggested that community notification 
could, in fact, jeopardize public safety by perpetuating and reinforcing common 
misconceptions about sexual abuse, and thereby potentially creating a false sense of 
security (Edwards and Hensley, 2001; Kemshall and Weaver, 2012; Levenson et al., 
2007).  
A related concern is that community notification schemes are premised on 
flawed logic. For example, the laws have been designed to protect potential victims 
from attacks by strangers, and yet the vast majority of sex offenses against children 
and adults alike are perpetrated by someone known to the victim (Cohen and Jeglic, 
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2007; Levenson, 2003; Welchans, 2005; Winick, 2003)15. It has been suggested that 
the law’s focus on the threat posed by strangers may leave the community more 
vulnerable to victimization at the hands of a family member or acquaintance (Meloy 
et al., 2007; Sandler et al., 2008; Vess et al., 2011). Furthermore, it has been pointed 
out that community notification laws can have, at best, only a modest impact on rates 
of sexual victimization in view of the fact that repeat offenders (i.e. those with prior 
convictions for sexual offenses) are responsible for only a very small proportion of 
all sex offenses (Langan et al., 2003; Sandler et al., 2008)16. Proponents of 
community notification have responded to these critiques by emphasizing the 
presumed general deterrent effect of these laws, that is, their potential to deter the 
population at large from sexually offending.  
Another rationale for community notification that is commonly articulated is 
that it can be a useful management tool for supervising sex offenders and, moreover, 
that it can facilitate the investigation of new sexual offenses (Gaines, 2006; Kemshall 
and Weaver, 2012). This suggestion is based on the idea that by engaging the 
community in the monitoring of known sex offenders, they are better placed to 
provide law enforcement agencies with valuable intelligence (Kemshall and Weaver, 
2012). This not only assumes that community members will be more vigilant as a 
result of community notification, but also that they will report suspicious activity to 
the relevant authorities. The results of a telephone survey of Washington residents (N 
= 643) conducted by Lieb and Nunlist (2008) do not offer compelling support for this 
assumption. Although the majority of respondents agreed that they were more likely 
																																																						
15It is generally reported that 70-95% of all reported sex offenses are committed by someone known to 
the victim (Catalano, 2005; Greenfeld, 1997; Snyder, 2000). 
 
16One US study found that over 95% of those arrested over a 21-year period for sex offenses did not 
have any prior convictions for sex offenses (Sandler et al., 2008). 
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to report suspicious behavior to the police as a result of learning that a sex offender 
lived nearby, less than 3% of those sampled had in fact reported that a known sex 
offender was engaging in questionable behavior in the preceding 12-month period.  
Another argument for community notification is that it heightens offenders’ 
awareness of their own risk and may therefore increase their motivation to engage in 
treatment (Levenson and Cotter, 2005; Vess et al., 2012). This could be considered 
another mechanism by which community notification may exert a specific deterrent 
effect. However, once again, this assumption has been disputed, with critics arguing 
that community notification can have precisely the opposite effect insofar as it may 
cause offenders to disengage from treatment and supervision; in effect driving them 
underground (Petrunik, 2003).  
It may then be, as Petrunik (2003: 61) proposed, that community notification 
laws are symbolic rather than instrumental in nature, their ‘essential purpose being to 
address public fear’. It cannot, however, be assumed that these laws do provide 
reassurance to members of the public. While some studies have found that 
community notification is an effective means of allaying the fear and anxieties of 
community members (e.g. Anderson and Sample, 2008; Phillips, 1998), others have 
found that it has had precisely the opposite effect (e.g. Kemshall and Weaver, 2012; 
Simpson Beck and Travis, 2004, 2006; Simpson Beck et al., 2004; Zevitz and 
Farkas, 2000b).  
The following sections provide a review of the current evidence relating to 
the impact of community notification policies on the management of offenders. 
Findings are reported in relation to the impact of such policies on: reintegration, 
(re)offending, risk management, and the impact on criminal justice agencies. 
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The Impact of Community Notification on Reintegration 
One of the more compelling arguments against community notification is that 
it impedes offenders’ reintegration into the community, which undermines their 
prospects of rehabilitation. A growing body of empirical evidence suggests that 
community notification leads to offenders being ostracized and persecuted, 
producing – or reinforcing – feelings of shame, embarrassment, hopelessness, stress, 
and alienation (Edwards and Hensley, 2001). It has also been shown to create a 
number of physical obstacles to reintegration including homelessness, 
unemployment, and the loss of social supports (Levenson et al., 2007; Tewksbury 
and Jennings, 2010). Community notification may place a strain on existing 
relationships, particularly if family and friends experience vilification due to their 
association with the offender, and may also impede the ability of offenders to 
cultivate new supportive relationships (Edwards and Hensley, 2001). Stable housing 
and employment and a supportive social network have been identified in the 
criminological literature as important predictors of successful reintegration and 
desistance from offending (Lasher and McGrath, 2012). The collateral consequences 
of community notification may, therefore, inadvertently jeopardize the successful 
reintegration of offenders by undermining those factors empirically associated with 
successful reintegration.   
The results of Zevitz and Farkas’s (2000b, 2000c) seminal study generated 
considerable attention as this study represented the first attempt to quantify the 
impact of community notification on offenders’ potential for successfully 
reintegrating into the community after a period of incarceration. The authors 
interviewed 30 male sex offenders residing in Wisconsin, reporting that all but one 
felt that community notification had adversely affected them in some way, with 
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difficulty securing stable accommodation and employment identified as having the 
most disruptive effect. The proportion of offenders who reported that they had been 
forced to relocate (83%) or lost a job (57%) as a result of community notification 
was surprisingly high. Furthermore, the majority of those sampled indicated that they 
had been ostracized by acquaintances or neighbors (77%) or had experienced threats 
or harassment (77%) after being publicly identified as a sex offender. Though these 
findings are of concern, it should be noted that all of the offenders surveyed were 
classified as high risk and, as a consequence, were subject to extensive community 
notification through media releases, distribution of flyers, and community meetings. 
Furthermore, the small sample size also limits the generalizability of these findings. 
A recent review by Lasher and McGrath (2012) lends support to Zevitz and 
Farkas’s (2000b, 2000c) findings, although the figures provided by Lasher and 
McGrath are more conservative than those reported by Zevitz and Farkas. Lasher and 
McGrath reviewed eight quantitative studies published between 2000 and 2009 
(including the study by Zevitz and Farkas) that examined the impact of community 
notification on offenders’ reintegration. Participants (N = 1,503; <1% female) were 
drawn from eight US states. Around half (51%) of the total sample reported they had 
lost social supports as a result of community notification, and a substantial minority 
indicated they had lost a job (30%), been threatened or harassed (20% or 44% 
depending on the wording of the question), been forced out of home (12% or 19% 
depending on question wording), or suffered property damage (14%). Psychological 
distress was also high among those sampled and feelings of shame, embarrassment, 
hopelessness, stress, and isolation were common (up to 60% of the total sample 
acknowledged experiencing these feelings).  
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It should be noted that Lasher and McGrath’s (2012) analysis revealed that 
there was considerable variability amongst the studies reviewed. Whilst this may be 
due, at least in part, to differences in the samples and methodologies used, such 
considerations are unlikely to fully account for the divergent results. The observed 
heterogeneity may, of course, be an accurate reflection of the differential impact of 
community notification laws in the various jurisdictions studied. As previously 
noted, there is a lack of uniformity in the law’s implementation and operation in each 
jurisdiction. Lasher and McGrath’s finding that community meetings were associated 
with a significantly higher rate of job loss when compared to other notification 
methods is noteworthy, particularly in light of the fact their review indicated that 
there was wide variation across states in this practice. This finding is consistent with 
the results of an earlier study by Levenson and Cotter (2005) which compared the 
impact of different notification methods. These authors found that, in general, more 
aggressive and intrusive notification strategies (such as community meetings) had a 
greater negative impact on offenders (N = 183) than more passive strategies. While 
these findings are insightful, methodological weaknesses of both studies limit the 
conclusions that can be drawn. Both studies used rather rudimentary data analytic 
techniques that failed to control for possible confounding factors, such as the 
offenders’ level of risk or degree of supervision.  
A major limitation of the body of literature examining the effect of 
community notification on reintegration is that it relies heavily on offenders’ self-
report. None of the aforementioned studies have attempted to substantiate the claims 
made by the offenders surveyed. A small-scale study of criminal justice 
practitioners’ (N = 13) perceptions of community notification undertaken by Finn 
(1997) does, however, partly corroborate the findings of these studies. Finn reported 
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that several of the professionals surveyed acknowledged that community notification 
can impede offenders’ ability to secure housing and find a job. Similar concerns were 
expressed by some of the law enforcement officers Gaines (2006) surveyed. These 
findings, taken together, lend support to studies that have examined the impact of 
community notification on reintegration from the perspective of offenders 
themselves. 
 Available evidence from the UK supports the claim that the limited 
disclosure scheme recently rolled out throughout the UK has not affected offenders 
to the same extent as community notification schemes operating in the US. However, 
in view of the fact that only two studies examining the impact of the UK scheme on 
offenders’ reintegration have been published, it is too early to draw any firm 
conclusions. Both of these studies are evaluations of the pilot programs that took 
place in England (Kemshall and Wood, 2010) and Scotland (Chan et al., 2010) 
between 2008 and 2010 which have now been rolled out nationally. Under this 
scheme, members of the public who have a concern about a particular individual who 
has contact with a child or children in their care can lodge an enquiry with the police, 
who are authorized to disclose to applicants whether the person of interest is a 
convicted sex offender. Initially, only parents, guardians, and carers were eligible to 
make an enquiry but this was later extended in England (but not Scotland) to any 
member of the public with a concern about the welfare of a particular child or 
children for whom they had caretaking responsibilities.  
 Both evaluations of the UK pilots garnered the perspectives of sex offenders 
residing in the pilot site regions. Although the majority of offenders interviewed by 
Kemshall and Wood (2010; N = 61), and at least some of those interviewed by Chan 
et al. (2010; N = 8), reported heightened anxiety, and some expressed anger, few had 
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experienced serious adverse consequences as a direct result of the limited disclosure 
pilot scheme, and none reported that it had affected their accommodation or 
employment prospects. Furthermore, the researchers were not made aware of any 
incidents of vigilantism. This is noteworthy because this was one of the chief 
concerns raised by the UK legislature in response to mounting public pressure to 
introduce widespread and unrestricted community notification (as in the US) 
following the highly publicized abduction and murder of 8-year-old Sarah Payne by 
a convicted sex offender in 2000 (Dean, 2000; Logan, 2011). Although the UK pilot 
evaluations permit cautious optimism, this optimism must be tempered by a caveat: 
none of the offenders who were interviewed as part of either the English or Scottish 
pilot evaluation had been the subject of a disclosure and, as such, none of the 
participants would have been directly affected by the scheme. The impact of the UK 
scheme on the reintegration of offenders about whom disclosures are made remains 
to be seen.   
It is evident from this body of research that community notification can have 
unintended negative social and psychological consequences for offenders which can 
impede their reintegration. The limited available evidence from the UK suggests that 
the controlled release of information about sex offenders may avert some of these 
collateral consequences and could, therefore, limit the negative impact of notification 
on reintegration. However, further research is needed before more definitive 
conclusions can be drawn.  
 
The Impact of Community Notification on Offending  
Sexual and general recidivism. It is well-established that successful 
reintegration into the community is empirically associated with desistance from 
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offending (Göbbels et al., 2012; Levenson et al., 2007; Tewksbury and Jennings, 
2010). Thus, the physical and psychosocial factors that have been shown to impede 
successful reintegration (such as homelessness, unemployment, loss of social ties, 
stress, and hopelessness) are also associated with an increased risk of reoffending 
(Edwards and Hensley, 2001; Lasher and McGrath, 2012; Levenson, 2003). This 
association raises serious questions regarding the ability of community notification 
laws to reduce reoffending, the purported goal of this legislation.  
Levenson et al. (2007: 598) have asserted that the marginalization and social 
exclusion experienced by sex offenders as a consequence of community notification 
may ‘diminish their investment in mainstream social values and increase their 
resentment toward society’. This could, in turn, increase the likelihood they will 
reoffend. Similarly, Winick (1998, 2003) has suggested that the labelling and 
stigmatization associated with community notification may have a negative impact 
on offenders’ self-concept and attributions, such that they may feel that they cannot 
escape the sex offender label and come to internalize society’s perception that they 
are unable to change or control their behavior. According to this argument, 
community notification produces feelings of learned helplessness, which can have a 
detrimental effect on offenders’ motivation to change and, ultimately, on their 
prospects of rehabilitation.  
In addition to the psychosocial stressors identified, the physical stressors 
associated with community notification also increase the risk of reoffending 
(Levenson and Cotter, 2005; Levenson et al., 2007; Tewksbury and Jennings, 2010; 
Zevitz and Farkas, 2000c;). As noted above, the prejudice and discrimination 
experienced by sex offenders as a result of community notification can impact on 
housing and employment prospects. Unemployment and a lack of secure, stable 
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accommodation have been identified as risk factors for recidivism, as has a lack of 
social support (Lasher and McGrath, 2012). These collateral consequences of 
community notification may induce stress, which has been shown to be an important 
antecedent to relapse (Cohen and Jeglic, 2007; Tewksbury and Jennings, 2010).  
Studies of the impact of community notification on recidivism have not 
produced uniform findings. However, on balance, the available empirical evidence 
does not provide support for the contention that community notification is an 
effective means of reducing recidivism. Whilst a small number of studies have found 
that community notification reduces sexual (e.g. Barnoski, 2005; Duwe and Donnay, 
2008) or general (e.g. Duwe and Donnay, 2008; Veysey et al., 2008) recidivism, 
most (e.g. Adkins et al., 2000; Letourneau et al., 2010b; Sandler et al., 2008; Zevitz, 
2006; Zgoba et al., 2009) have not found that it leads to an appreciable reduction in 
either sexual or general recidivism, and the results of at least one study (Prescott and 
Rockoff, 2008) suggest that it can in fact increase recidivism. Still others (e.g. 
Freeman, 2012; Schram and Milloy, 1995) have concluded that although community 
notification does not have a significant impact on the rate of recidivism, it is 
correlated with a significant decrease in “time to failure”, as measured by rearrest, 
reconviction, or reincarceration rates.  
Freeman (2012) found that sex offenders who were subject to community 
notification under New York’s law (N = 10,592) were rearrested twice as quickly for 
a sexual offense and one-and-a-half times more quickly for a non-sexual offense than 
those not subject to notification requirements upon release from prison (N = 6,573). 
This finding corroborates an earlier finding reported by Schram and Milloy (1995). 
These authors determined from a survival analysis that offenders in their sample who 
had been subject to community notification in Washington (N = 90) tended to be 
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rearrested considerably more quickly for a new offense of any kind than a matched 
sample of offenders (N = 90) who had not been subject to notification. It is not clear 
how to interpret these findings. Although a faster rearrest rate could be considered 
evidence that community notification is not effective, an argument can also be made 
that the increased surveillance associated with community notification led to the 
earlier detection and apprehension of recidivists.  
There is also a lack of robust evidence to suggest that community notification 
has any effect on the number or nature of offences committed by recidivists, 
although it should be acknowledged that few studies have examined this, and, as 
such, it would be premature to draw any firm conclusions. Tewksbury and Jennings 
(2010) compared the sexual and general recidivism patterns amongst a large cohort 
of offenders from Iowa who were subject to community notification (N = 823; 99% 
male) with a matched sample of offenders who were released from prison prior to the 
passage and implementation of these laws (N = 759; 98% male). Offenders were 
tracked for five years following release from prison. Few differences emerged 
between the two groups. Offenders in both groups could be reliably classified into 
one of three subgroups representing three distinct reoffending trajectories: non-
recidivists, low-rate recidivists, and higher-rate recidivists. The distribution of 
offenders within each subgroup was virtually identical between the notification and 
comparison groups, leading the authors to conclude that community notification did 
not have any appreciable effect on either the rate of recidivism or the number of 
offenses committed by recidivists. A limitation of this study that is common to many 
studies in this area of research is that the treatment and comparison groups may not 
have been comparable by virtue of the fact offenders within each group were 
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released from prison during two different periods in time (i.e. pre- and post-
implementation). This may have masked the effects of community notification.  
There are a number of methodological limitations inherent in this literature, 
owing largely to the retrospective quasi-experimental study design that is 
characteristic of research in this area (Day et al., 2012). Empirical studies examining 
the impact of community notification on recidivism typically compare the recidivism 
rates of sex offenders released from prison prior to and subsequent to the enactment 
of legislation introducing these measures. A smaller number of studies have 
modelled the effects of community notification using time series analysis. A major 
limitation of both of these study designs is that it is not possible to infer causality 
and, as such, causal explanations can only be considered to be speculative. The 
possibility that historical trends in crime rates or wider socio-political trends account 
for the findings cannot be excluded. Most researchers have failed to consider the 
impact of other legislative or policy measures introduced during the same period, 
notably the effects of mandatory registration of sex offenders, which clouds the 
interpretation of findings. Furthermore, although most group comparison studies 
have made some attempt to match the ‘treatment’ (i.e. notification) and comparison 
groups, often important demographic or offense-related variables that are empirically 
associated with recidivism are overlooked, which could mean that the groups are not 
comparable and thus confounds the interpretation of findings. More generally, this is 
reflective of the greater difficulty of quasi-experimental research to control for 
extraneous variables that may mediate or moderate the relationship being 
investigated.  
A further limitation of the body of research concerned with the impact of 
community notification on recidivism is that most published studies have restricted 
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the analysis to only one jurisdiction. The results of single-site or single-state studies 
may have limited generalizability due to the marked variation that exists between 
jurisdictions in the relevant legislation, policies, and practices. Multi-state 
evaluations may overcome some of these limitations, permitting greater confidence 
in the conclusions drawn. In one such study, Prescott and Rockoff (2011) examined 
the specific and general deterrent effects of registration and community notification 
by modelling mathematical equations and testing their fit against aggregated arrest 
data for 15 US states. The authors tentatively concluded that the introduction of 
community notification led to an increase in recidivism. This study is one of only a 
few to have examined the main effects of registration and notification policies in 
addition to their interactive effects. Although this is a significant strength of this 
study, it is not without limitations. Confidence in the interpretation of the results is 
limited by the fact that Prescott and Rockoff had to draw inferences as to the likely 
specific deterrent effect based on the number of offenders subject to community 
notification as the data did not permit distinctions between first-time offenses and 
repeat offenses (i.e. those committed by a convicted sex offender who would have 
been subject to notification requirements).  
 The results of two independent systematic reviews do not offer support for 
the assertion that community notification deters convicted sex offenders from 
reoffending. Drake and Aos (2009) located 18 studies that examined the impact of 
the passage of registration and notification laws on crime rates, of which only nine 
were judged to have been of sufficient methodological rigor to be included in their 
quantitative analysis. A meta-analysis of the seven studies that investigated the 
impact of these laws on the rate of recidivism failed to find a statistically significant 
effect. Drake and Aos cautioned that their conclusion that these laws are ineffective 
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in reducing recidivism should be considered tentative as it was based on just seven 
studies – three of which had small sample sizes – and there was considerable 
variability in the results of these studies, with two studies reporting that the 
implementation of these laws was associated with a significant reduction in 
recidivism, one study reporting a significant increase in recidivism following 
implementation, and the remainder reporting no significant difference in recidivism 
rates pre- and post-implementation.  
Similar conclusions were drawn by Socia and Stamatel (2010), who reviewed 
the effect of community notification on recidivism as part of a broader review of the 
effectiveness of the various laws targeting sex offenders that have been enacted in 
the US during the past two decades. Consistent with the findings of Drake and Aos’s 
(2009) review, Socia and Stamatel also concluded that community notification has 
had no demonstrable effect on recidivism. This is not surprising given the 
considerable overlap in the studies included in both reviews. Four of the seven 
studies in each review were the same, including the only two studies that found 
evidence of a specific deterrent effect. It should be noted that both of these reviews 
considered the aggregate effects of registration and notification. 
On balance then, the available empirical evidence does not support the 
conclusion that community notification reduces recidivism. However, in light of the 
fact the evidence is equivocal and hampered by a number of methodological 
limitations, this conclusion should be regarded as tentative. Interpretation of findings 
is further complicated by the complexities of the relationships under investigation. It 
is possible, for example, that a non-significant finding is actually the product of two 
competing forces, such that community notification may lead to a reduction in the 
true incidence of reoffending but this reduction may be offset by an increased 
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likelihood that offenders subject to notification who reoffend will be detected and 
apprehended on account of the increased surveillance (Vásquez et al., 2008; Vess et 
al., 2012).     
Non-recidivistic sexual offending.	A small body of empirical evidence 
exists suggesting that community notification has a general deterrent effect on the 
public at large. However, the findings are inconsistent and often ambiguous and this 
literature suffers from the same methodological limitations that hamper the 
interpretation of the results of studies that have investigated the specific deterrent 
effect of these laws.  
 Although the results of a study by Letourneau and colleagues (Letourneau et 
al., 2010a) are consistent with a general deterrent effect and have been cited as proof 
of the law’s effectiveness, the authors were unable to definitively conclude that the 
observed downward trend in sex offense arrests was due to the introduction of 
community notification. Letourneau et al. modelled the effects of the enactment of 
registration and notification laws in South Carolina on sex offending rates. The 
results of their trend analysis revealed an 11% reduction in the monthly rate of first-
time sex offense arrests from pre- to post-implementation, lending support to the 
argument that these laws exert a general deterrent effect. The authors were, however, 
unable to partial out the unique contribution of community notification due to the 
fact it came into effect at the same time as mandatory registration. They did, 
however, model the effects of the introduction of the publicly accessible online sex 
offender register four years later and found that it had no appreciable effect on first-
time sex offense arrests.  
In contrast to Letourneau et al.’s (2010a) findings, Sandler et al. (2008) failed 
to find evidence of a general deterrent effect of New York’s registration and 
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notification laws. These two studies employed similar methodologies and yet yielded 
markedly different results. It is not clear whether the divergent results reflect real 
differences in arrest trends, which could suggest that the policies in each state have 
idiosyncratic effects, or whether the discrepancy is simply a methodological artefact. 
It is noteworthy that New York’s policy selectively targets higher-risk sex offenders 
whereas South Carolina does not discriminate on the basis of risk, with all registered 
sex offenders being subjected to the same level of notification.  
The results of a larger-scale multi-state study suggest that the relevant laws in 
each jurisdiction have a differential impact on sex offense rates. Vásquez et al. 
(2008) conducted interrupted time series analyses in order to determine whether the 
implementation of registration and notification had any impact on the incidence of 
rape in 10 US states. No clear trends emerged from the data. Three of the 10 states 
included in the analysis showed a significant decline in the rate of rape following the 
implementation of these laws but one state showed a sharp (and significant) incline 
in the rape rate from pre- to post-implementation. There was no statistically 
significant difference in rape rates for the six remaining states. Vásquez et al. 
concluded that these laws have not had a uniform observable influence on sexual 
offending but did not offer any possible explanation to account for the divergent 
results. A limitation of this study is that the authors were not able to conclusively 
determine whether the observed decrease in the rape rate in three states was 
attributable to a general, as opposed to a specific, deterrent effect, nor could they 
determine whether the observed effects were due to registration or notification. A 
further limitation of this study is that only the incidence of rape was considered. 
Notwithstanding these limitations, the findings of this study are informative and 
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underscore the importance of exercising caution when generalizing the results of 
single-state studies.   
The aforementioned multi-state study by Prescott and Rockoff (2011) 
demonstrated that the passage and implementation of community notification laws 
was associated with a decline in the arrest rate for first-time offenders (i.e. those 
without any prior convictions for sex offenses), lending support to the assertion that 
community notification has a general deterrent effect. Though encouraging, this 
finding should be qualified by the concomitant finding that the enactment of these 
laws was associated with an increase in the recidivism rate. Prescott and Rockoff 
hypothesized that there could be a trade-off between general and specific deterrent 
effects such that the threat of notification and its associated costs might effectively 
deter some would-be sex offenders from offending but that the high personal costs of 
notification may increase the likelihood that convicted offenders will reoffend. 
Although this is certainly plausible, further research must be conducted before any 
firm conclusions can be drawn, as Prescott and Rockoff were unable to 
systematically test this hypothesis due to limitations of the data.  
 
The Impact of Community Notification on Risk Management  
Although often cited as a benefit of community notification (e.g. Finn, 1997), 
there is a paucity of empirical evidence in relation to its potential usefulness as a 
management tool for supervising sex offenders in the community. There is limited 
evidence to support the suggestion that it generates intelligence that is useful from a 
risk management perspective and that may aid in the investigation of sex crimes 
(Farkas and Zevitz, 2000; Finn, 1997; Gaines, 2006). An evaluation of the 
implementation of community notification in Oregon, for example, noted that 
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members of the public provided law enforcement with valuable information 
concerning the activities of sex offenders subject to notification (Oregon Department 
of Corrections, 1995). Similarly, one of the law enforcement agents Gaines (2006) 
surveyed recounted an instance where information provided by a member of the 
public led to an offender’s arrest. In view of the fact this evidence is largely 
anecdotal, it should be interpreted with caution. It could be argued that the finding 
that offenders subject to community notification are rearrested more quickly 
following release from prison than those who are not (e.g. Duwe and Donnay, 2008; 
Freeman, 2012; Schram and Milloy, 1995) supports the contention that community 
notification facilitates the provision of intelligence. However, as previously noted, 
such a finding is open to several different interpretations and is often confounded by 
the introduction of mandatory registration.  
 Notwithstanding reports that community notification has assisted in locating 
offenders who have absconded (e.g. Oregon Department of Corrections, 1995), there 
is a widely held view that such practices can cause offenders to disengage from 
supervision and treatment, driving them underground. Such a concern has been 
expressed by both law enforcement agents and mental health professionals working 
within the justice system as well as offenders themselves (Chan et al., 2010; 
Kemshall and Wood, 2010; Logan, 2011; McGuickin and Brown, 2001). Indeed, 
several of the offenders (N = 15) Wood and Kemshall (2007) surveyed admitted that 
they would probably fail to report, or, in the words of one offender, they would 
‘disappear’ if the US model of community notification were to be introduced in the 
UK. In spite of these views, there is very little empirical evidence indicating that the 
implementation of community notification has affected offenders’ compliance with 
reporting obligations or other conditions of supervision (Kemshall and Wood, 2010). 
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That said, very few studies have examined this, and a lack of evidence demonstrating 
that it affects compliance should not be interpreted as evidence that it does not affect 
compliance.  
 There is some anecdotal evidence that community notification promotes 
greater information sharing and collaboration amongst criminal justice agencies 
(Chan et al., 2010; Farkas and Zevitz, 2000; Finn, 1997; Zevitz and Farkas, 2000b). 
While one might expect that this would lead to more effective risk management, this 
relationship has not been systematically tested. Taken together, these findings 
provide only limited support for the contention that community notification is an 
effective management tool, and, on the contrary, suggest that in some cases it may 
even be a hindrance to effective risk management.   
 
The Impact of Community Notification on Criminal Justice Agencies   
 A small but growing body of research demonstrates that community 
notification has a significant impact on the agencies responsible for its administration 
(typically the police have primary responsibility). One of the most frequently cited 
concerns of administrators is that it places a strain on limited agency resources 
(Lasher and McGrath, 2012; Levenson and Cotter, 2005; Levenson et al., 2010). 
Community notification schemes are undeniably expensive to implement and 
maintain, irrespective of whether they are active or passive (Tewksbury and 
Jennings, 2010; Zevitz and Farkas, 2000c; Zgoba et al., 2009). The time and money 
invested in activities associated with notification inevitably must be redirected from 
other areas, which could plausibly lead to an increase in other types of crime (Day et 
al., 2012).  
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Sandler et al. (2008) speculated that the practice of community notification 
could result in resources being diverted from those offenders – or potential offenders 
– who account for the majority of sex offenses (i.e. those without any prior 
convictions and those with a pre-established relationship with the victim) to the 
relatively small number of offenders targeted by these laws who, in spite of fitting 
the stereotype of a sex offender, account for only a minority of all sex offenses. In a 
similar vein, Vess et al. (2012) asserted that the indiscriminate process of subjecting 
sex offenders who pose a relatively minimal risk to public safety to notification may 
detract attention and resources from the few who pose a very high risk. This 
assertion echoes an earlier remark by Appelbaum (2008: 354), who noted that 
subjecting anyone ever convicted of a sex offense to notification without regard for 
the level of risk they present ‘blur[s] the focus of police and the public on the most 
dangerous offenders’. Furthermore, other important law enforcement functions may 
suffer as a consequence of community notification. This reality must be borne in 
mind when appraising the relevant literature evaluating the law’s impact on law 
enforcement agencies.  
 One of the most consistent findings of the body of research investigating the 
impact of community notification is that it is associated with an increased workload. 
Respondents to Matson’s (1996) survey of Washington-based police chiefs and 
sheriffs (N = 45) identified both advantages and disadvantages of community 
notification, with increased workload among the most frequently cited 
disadvantages. Many noted that community notification is a very time-consuming 
task that ‘spreads resources thin’. An evaluation of the impact of the enactment of 
these laws in Wisconsin produced similar findings (Zevitz and Farkas, 2000b; see 
also Farkas and Zevitz, 2000). Over two-thirds of the law enforcement agents 
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surveyed (N = 188) reported concerns relating to resource implications and the 
majority (58%) indicated that community notification had increased their workload. 
Zevitz and Farkas (see also Zevitz and Farkas, 2000a) also found that the enactment 
of these laws has had a significant impact on the demands of probation and parole 
officers (N = 77), many of whom reported that difficulties sourcing accommodation 
and employment for offenders subject to notification significantly increased their 
workload.  
Although the findings of these studies appear to be reflective of the 
experiences of other jurisdictions within the US (Finn, 1997), it should be 
acknowledged that these studies are now over a decade old and it is probable that 
community notification practices in these jurisdictions have changed since these 
evaluations were undertaken. As previously noted, since the enactment of federal 
legislation in 2003 mandating all states to publish details about convicted sex 
offenders on the Internet, there has been a steady decline in some of the more 
resource-intensive notification strategies that were widely practiced throughout the 
1990s, such as community meetings and door-to-door flyer drops, both of which 
were common practices in Washington and Wisconsin at the time these evaluations 
were undertaken (Appelbaum, 2008; Levenson et al., 2007). A decline in resource-
intensive notification strategies presumably would reduce the workload of law 
enforcement agencies. However, over this same period, the criteria stipulating who 
qualifies for community notification have been expanded, which has essentially 
produced a net-widening effect (Appelbaum, 2008; Levenson and Cotter, 2005; 
Thompson and Greek, 2010). Furthermore, the mandated duration of notification has 
been extended in most states, with many offenders now subject to lifetime 
notification via the online register (Appelbaum, 2008; Levenson et al., 2010). 
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Consequently, the number of offenders on the online register has grown 
exponentially in the last decade.  
Posting and maintaining the accuracy of information on the online sex 
offender register has thus become an onerous and time-consuming task on account of 
the large number of offenders subject to notification. Gaines (2006) conducted a 
survey of law enforcement agents (N = 21) responsible for managing the online 
register in 11 US states. He reported that several respondents commented that it was 
a ‘manpower intensive’ task. Not surprisingly, maintaining the accuracy of 
information on the register has been identified as a significant challenge facing law 
enforcement agencies and numerous reports have emerged indicating that much of 
the information contained on the online registers is inaccurate (Lasher and McGrath, 
2012; Levenson and Cotter, 2005). As Levenson et al. (2007: 589) note, ‘these 
reports call into question the capacity for state officials to continuously update sex 
offender databases quickly enough to maintain accurate flow of information to the 
public’.  
The limited available evidence from the UK indicates that passive community 
notification schemes also have a significant impact on the workloads of those 
responsible for responding to enquiries from members of the public. The evaluations 
of the English (Kemshall & Wood, 2010) and Scottish (Chan et al., 2010) limited 
disclosure pilots noted that these schemes demanded a substantial investment of 
time, particularly during the implementation phase. This is in spite of the fact that all 
five pilot sites received significantly fewer enquiries than anticipated. A dedicated 
team was established at each pilot site to implement and administer the scheme. 
Chan et al. estimated that each enquiry fielded during the Scottish pilot program 
took, on average, just under eight hours to finalize; however, there was marked 
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variation in the amount of time dedicated to each case. Documented resolution times 
for a sample of cases (N = 24) ranged from 2 to 15 hours per case. It should be noted 
that these estimates do not include the time devoted to general administrative tasks 
that did not relate to a particular enquiry. It was estimated that this would add just 
under three-and-a-half hours to each case if this were factored in. These early 
findings suggest that the passive model of community notification adopted in the UK 
is also very resource-intensive. However, further research is needed before more 
definitive conclusions can be drawn.  
 Community notification may increase the workload of law enforcement 
agents in other, less obvious, ways. For example, it may add to their workload by 
inciting vigilantism, to which they must respond. Although the actual incidence of 
vigilantism appears to be lower than that which is commonly anticipated17, there 
nonetheless have been numerous reports of vigilantism connected to community 
notification (Appelbaum, 2008; Levenson, 2003; Redlich, 2001; Tewksbury and 
Lees, 2006), and it remains the case that just one serious incident can create a 
significant amount of work. Law enforcement agencies may attempt to circumvent 
vigilantism through community engagement by educating the public and allaying 
anxieties, which could also potentially involve a considerable investment of time. A 
further means by which community notification can impact on the workload of law 
enforcement agents is they may be expected to find solutions to problems created by 
community notification, such as homelessness and unemployment, even though such 
responsibilities may not be part of their usual role.  
																																																						
17Empirical evidence suggests that between 3-16% of sex offenders subject to notification are the 
target of vigilante attacks (Lasher and McGrath, 2012; Levenson and Cotter, 2005; Levenson et al., 
2007; Oregon Department of Corrections, 1995; Zevitz and Farkas, 2000c). 
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 In conclusion, it is apparent that community notification has significant 
resourcing implications in terms of the high fiscal and labor costs associated with its 
implementation and ongoing maintenance. Given the lack of empirical evidence 
supporting the effectiveness of these measures, it may be difficult to justify these 
expenditures, particularly in light of evidence suggesting that community notification 
could in fact jeopardize community safety. 
 
Discussion 
 It may be tempting to conclude on the basis of this review that community 
notification is ineffective, and that the introduction of the scheme in WA is ill-
informed. However, it seems premature to conclude that community notification is 
ineffective as the findings of many of the studies reviewed here are somewhat 
equivocal. The possibility remains that community notification is effective in some 
circumstances but ineffective in others, and broad judgements about its overall 
effectiveness fail to capture the complexities of the interrelationships between the 
many factors at play. Pawson’s (2006b) argument that for policy evaluations to be 
meaningful they must move beyond the question of whether interventions work and 
instead address how and why they work is relevant here. He suggests that a more 
useful question to ask is: ‘What works for whom in what circumstances?’ (Pawson, 
2006b: 25). 
Few researchers have hypothesised as to the conditions under which 
community notification is of optimal effectiveness. Letourneau and colleagues 
(2010b) speculated that the wide net cast by these policies could be masking 
differential effects for different groups of offenders. Certainly the last decade has 
seen a dramatic increase in the number of offenders who are subject to notification in 
	 45 
the US. This is largely due to the fact that the criteria stipulating who qualifies for 
notification have become more inclusive over time. One might expect that these 
measures would have a differential impact on subgroups of offenders, such as 
intrafamilial versus extrafamilial sex offenders, or those classified as low- versus 
high-risk.  
It is noteworthy that the only two published studies that have found that 
community notification reduces recidivism (Barnoski, 2005; Duwe and Donnay, 
2008) both employed samples exclusively comprised of offenders assigned the 
highest risk classification and who were subjected to the most extensive notification. 
It follows that community notification may be most effective when only high-risk 
offenders are selected, as was the original intent of the legislation. The tiered 
notification scheme introduced in WA combines elements of a US-style proactive 
notification system with a UK-style reactive system and takes offenders’ risk level 
into consideration. This will allow outcomes to be compared for different subgroups 
of offenders, thereby facilitating determinations regarding the efficacy of notification 
for different subgroups of sex offenders.  
As is apparent from this review, community notification places a significant 
strain on limited agency resources. Subjecting low-risk offenders who present a 
relatively small risk of reoffending to notification, or using methods that have the 
potential to undermine rather than enhance public safety, is probably not an efficient 
use of public resources. Identifying the conditions under which community 
notification is and is not effective will allow these measures to be more targeted, 
maximizing the use of limited resources. This is a useful direction for future 
research.  
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In conclusion, it will be interesting to see how the implementation of the 
community notification scheme in WA will be received by the public, the criminal 
justice system and by offenders themselves. The purpose of this paper was to provide 
a comprehensive review of current knowledge about community notification that can 
be used to inform the interpretation of any data that are gathered to establish the 
extent to which it can be regarded as successfully achieving its objectives. It may 
also be of value to those in other Australasian jurisdictions that are considering 
introducing community notification schemes, in their efforts to ensure that public 
policy in this area is, indeed, truly evidence-based.  
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CHAPTER 3: STUDY 1 
	
 This chapter presents the first empirical study; a qualitative exploration of 
police officers’ perceptions of the community notification scheme introduced in 
Australia. The study, which has been accepted for publication in the International 
Journal of Police Science and Management (see Whitting, Day, & Powell, 2016)18, 
presents an analysis of in-depth interviews with 21 specialist police officers. The 
results of this study guided the focus of the second empirical study presented in 
Chapter 4. 
 Community notification statutes, popularly known as ‘Megan’s Law’, were 
passed in rapid succession throughout the United States (US) following the 
enactment of landmark legislation in the state of Washington in 1990 (see Lasher & 
McGrath, 2012; Petrunik, 2003; Thomas, 2011)19. By 1996, when the federal 
government enacted legislation mandating community notification, a majority of 
states had already adopted this policy (Matson, 1996; Washington State Institute for 
Public Policy, 1996); often in response to public outcry in the wake of highly 
publicised sex offences against children (Levenson, 2003; Petrunik, 2003; Small, 
1999; Thomas, 2011; Thompson & Greek, 2010). The form that notification takes 
varies from state to state (e.g., door-knocking, community meetings, posters, flyers, 
social media; see Harris, Lobanov-Rostovsky, & Levenson, 2015, p. 5), but federal 
legislation mandates that all states must maintain a publicly accessible online sex 
																																																						
18Whitting, L., Day, A., & Powell, M. (2016). Police officer perspectives on the implementation of a 
sex offender community notification scheme. International Journal of Police Science and 
Management. Advance online publication. doi: 10.1177/1461355716668539. Note the formatting of 
this chapter is consistent with the journal’s specifications. 
 
19See Thomas (2011) for an in-depth review of the legislative background to current community 
notification laws.  
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offender register (see Thomas, 2011). The information that is published generally 
includes the offender’s name, date of birth, gender, address, past convictions, a 
physical description and photograph, and may also include their driver’s licence 
number, a description of their motor vehicle including licence plate number, their 
place of employment, their victim’s gender and age, and risk rating (see Ackerman, 
Harris, Levenson, & Zgoba, 2011 for a descriptive analysis of the content of state-
based online public sex offender registries). 
 When these laws first came into effect, generally only those convicted of 
more serious sex offences against children were affected. The scope of these laws 
has, however, expanded over time and the relevant criteria have come to include a 
wider range of offences, with some states now publishing the details of all adults – 
and in some cases juveniles – who have been convicted of a sex offence of any kind 
(Appelbaum, 2008; Thompson & Greek, 2010). This is despite evidence that 
community notification may not reduce rates of sexual offending. Drake and Aos’ 
(2009) meta-analysis of the impact of the passage of sex offender registration and 
notification laws on crime rates in the US, for example, concluded that they did not 
lead to statistically significant reductions in recidivism. However, they cautioned that 
the evidence upon which this conclusion was drawn was limited (the seven studies 
which were judged to be of sufficient rigour to be included reported conflicting 
findings and three had small sample sizes). Drake and Aos were also unable to 
separate the independent effects of registration and notification. A subsequent 
systematic review of the literature by Socia and Stamatel (2010), however, lends 
weight to the general conclusion of Drake and Aos; namely that the introduction of 
community notification in the US has had no demonstrable effect on recidivism. 
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Fewer studies still have investigated whether community notification deters 
those who have never been convicted of a sex offence. Whilst some (e.g., 
Letourneau, Levenson, Bandyopadhyay, Armstrong, & Sinha, 2010) have found 
evidence of a general deterrent effect, others (e.g., Sandler, Freeman, & Socia, 2008) 
have not. Nonetheless, the results of a larger-scale multi-state study by Vásquez, 
Maddan, and Walker (2008) are informative. These authors conducted interrupted 
time series analysis in order to determine whether registration and notification laws 
had an impact on the incidence of rape in 10 US states. No clear trends emerged 
from their analysis, with six states showing no significant change, three states 
showing a significant decline, and one state showing a significant increase in the rate 
of rape. Vásquez et al. concluded that these laws had not had a uniform observable 
influence on rates of sexual offending. 
A more recent large-scale multi-state study by Prescott and Rockoff (2011) 
examined both specific and general deterrent effects by modelling mathematical 
equations and testing their fit against aggregated arrest data for 15 US states. The 
authors tentatively concluded that the introduction of community notification had led 
to a decrease in the arrest rate for first-time offenders (i.e., those without any prior 
convictions for sex offences), although this was offset by an increase in the arrest 
rate for repeat offenders. This finding led Prescott and Rockoff to hypothesise that 
there is a trade-off between general and specific deterrence; however, they were 
unable to systematically test this hypothesis due to the limitations of the available 
data. 
At the same time, evidence has emerged that community notification can 
have collateral consequences that jeopardise offenders’ successful reintegration and 
rehabilitation (Edwards & Hensley, 2001; Lasher & McGrather, 2012; Whitting, 
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Day, & Powell, 2014). Surveys of offenders subject to notification reveal that 
harassment, threats, and property damage are commonplace, which contributes to 
heightened psychological distress (Levenson & Cotter, 2005; Levenson, D'Amora, & 
Hern, 2007; Tewksbury, 2005; Zevitz & Farkas, 2000b). Offenders also commonly 
report that they experience the loss of social supports, housing, and employment as a 
result of notification (Levenson & Cotter, 2005; Levenson, D'Amora, et al., 2007; 
Tewksbury, 2005; Zevitz & Farkas, 2000b). This is significant given the well-
established correlation between each of these factors and recidivism (Hanson & 
Harris, 2000; Hanson, Harris, Scott, & Helmus, 2007; Hanson & Morton-Bourgon, 
2005). Furthermore, it has been suggested that community notification can hinder 
effective risk management by driving offenders underground (see Chan, Homes, 
Murray, & Treanor, 2010; Hudson, 2005; Logan, 2011; Petrunik, 2003; Wood & 
Kemshall, 2007). 
Despite the lack of robust evidence supporting the effectiveness of these 
laws, they enjoy widespread support in the US. Surveys of the public have generally 
found a high level of endorsement for community notification policies (Anderson & 
Sample, 2008; Harris & Socia, 2014; Katz-Schiavone & Jeglic, 2009; Levenson, 
Brannon, Fortney, & Baker, 2007; Lieb & Nunlist, 2008; Phillips, 1998)20. Fewer 
studies have examined the views of professional stakeholders. This small but 
growing body of research indicates that criminal justice professionals are generally 
the most supportive, with Levenson, Fortney, and Baker (2010), for example, 
reporting that they were significantly more likely than other professionals who 
worked with offenders (most of whom had a background in mental health) to agree 
with the notification laws in their state and to believe that all sex offenders should be 
																																																						
20The evidence is more mixed in other parts of the world (see, for example, McCartan, 2004; 2013). 
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subject to notification. Interestingly, the majority of the criminal justice professionals 
surveyed indicated that they would support sex offender policies even if there was no 
scientific evidence showing they reduce child sexual abuse. 
Tewskbury and colleagues have drawn similar conclusions based on the 
findings of a programme of research investigating the views of law enforcement 
officials (Tewksbury & Mustaine, 2013), probation and parole officers (Tewksbury, 
Mustaine, & Payne, 2011), prison wardens (Connor, 2012, cited by Mustaine, 
Tewkbsury, Connor, & Payne, 2015), and parole board members (Tewksbury & 
Mustaine, 2012). Tewksbury and Mustaine (2013), for example, found that most law 
enforcement officials did not believe that being listed on a public sex offender 
register was an effective deterrent, nor did they believe that these laws were 
otherwise effective in reducing sex offences, and yet most believed that all sex 
offenders should be subject to notification. They concluded that:  
It appears that many criminal justice officials are in support of sex offender 
polices, even if there is no scientific evidence to suggest they work, and even 
when the rationale for such support is unclear. As such, it becomes quite 
apparent that attitudes about sex offender registration and notification are 
complex and difficult to understand. (Tewksbury & Mustaine, 2013, p. 111) 
Although law enforcement officers are generally found to be largely 
supportive of community notification, most do not believe it should be the 
responsibility of law enforcement (Walker & Ervin-McLarty, 2000), and increased 
workload and a lack of resources are common complaints among these professionals 
(Finn, 1997; Gaines, 2006; Matson & Lieb 1996). More than two-thirds of the 
Wisconsin law enforcement agencies that Farkas and Zevitz (2000) surveyed (total n 
= 188), for example, indicated that they were concerned about labour expenditures. 
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Furthermore, the majority reported that the law increased their workload and over 
one quarter believed that it placed a strain on departmental resources. 
Other parts of the world have implemented community notification schemes 
that are more limited in scope than those that currently exist in the US. In the United 
Kingdom (UK), the government has resisted community pressure for a public sex 
offender register. However, in response to sustained media attention and community 
lobbying following the high-profile abduction and murder of an eight-year-old girl 
by a convicted sex offender, the Home Office announced in 2008 that it would be 
piloting a ‘limited disclosure’ scheme across four police force areas of England (see 
Logan, 2011; Kemshall & Weaver, 2012; Thomas, 2011). The scheme allowed 
parents and guardians21 to enquire about a particular individual who had 
unsupervised contact with their child and empowered police to disclose to the 
applicant that the person of concern was a registered sex offender, where this was 
warranted. The pilot was hailed a success and the scheme was subsequently rolled 
out across England and Wales (Kemshall & Weaver, 2012). Shortly thereafter, 
Scotland introduced a similar scheme following its own pilot (Kemshall & Weaver, 
2012). 
The results of the English (Kemshall & Wood, 2010; see also Kemshall, 
Dominey, & Hilder, 2011; Kemshall, Kelly, & Wilkinson, 2012) and Scottish (Chan 
et al., 2010) pilot evaluations suggest that the controlled and limited disclosure of 
information to members of the public has fewer negative consequences than blanket 
disclosure, as embodied in ‘Megan’s Law’ in the US. None of the offenders 
interviewed by Kemshall and Wood (n = 61) or Chan et al. (n = 8) reported that they 
																																																						
21The scheme was later expanded in England (and following its roll out, Wales) to allow anyone with 
caretaking responsibilities for a child to lodge an enquiry (Kemshall & Weaver, 2012).  
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had experienced difficulties finding accommodation or employment as a result of the 
scheme, and no incidents of vigilantism were reported. However, it should be noted 
that none of the offenders interviewed had been the subject of a disclosure and, as 
such, it would not be expected that they would be directly impacted.  
The introduction of limited disclosure schemes in the UK led to calls for the 
introduction of community notification to gain momentum in Australia. This 
culminated in 2012, when one Australian state enacted legislation providing for the 
disclosure of information about convicted sex offenders to the public. The three-
tiered scheme introduced later that same year draws on elements of both the UK and 
US models of notification. The first tier pertains to offenders who have failed to 
comply with their reporting obligations or who have provided false or misleading 
information, and whose whereabouts are unknown to police. The name, date of birth, 
gender, physical description and photograph of such persons are published on an 
online register that can be viewed by anyone. The second tier allows residents of the 
state to perform a search that will return the photographs of dangerous, high risk, and 
recidivist offenders who reside in close proximity to them (i.e., in the same suburb or 
an adjoining suburb). The criteria are restrictive, capturing only a small proportion 
(less than 5%) of registered sex offenders. The third tier was modelled on the 
schemes introduced in the UK and allows parents and guardians to enquire whether a 
particular individual who has unsupervised contact with their child or children is a 
registered sex offender. A specialist police squad responsible for coordinating the 
ongoing management, registration, and monitoring of sex offenders living in the 
community is tasked with managing the scheme. 
In 2014 another Australian state began publishing the details of child sex 
offenders whose whereabouts are unknown, and a bill has recently been drafted in a 
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third jurisdiction that could see the introduction of more extensive community 
notification as is practised in the US. The bill is named ‘Daniel’s Law’ in honour of 
Daniel Morcombe, a 13-year-old boy who was abducted and murdered by a 
convicted sex offender (Elferink, 2015). Daniel’s parents and supporters have been 
campaigning for ‘Daniel’s Law’ to be introduced nationally, and it is quite possible 
that other jurisdictions will soon follow suit. It is in this context that the current study 
explores how Australia’s first community notification scheme has been viewed by 
those who are responsible for managing it. 
There has been one previous investigation of this topic in Australia. Powell, 
Day, Benson, Vess, and Graffam (2014) conducted focus groups with police officers 
(N = 24) across three different jurisdictions prior to the introduction of community 
notification. Whilst not the focus of this study, participants independently raised a 
number of concerns regarding its possible introduction, including that it would place 
an additional burden on police resources, that it would reduce offenders’ compliance, 
and increase the risk of re-offending. The current study builds on Powell et al.’s 
study by providing a detailed analysis of the expectations and concerns of police 
officers involved in implementing Australia’s first community notification scheme. It 
adds to the growing body of research from the US examining criminal justice 
professionals’ views of community notification, which, as Tewksbury and Mustaine 
(2013) have observed, reveals that attitudes toward notification are complex and 
multi-faceted. With few exceptions, research in this area has used a survey 
methodology, and whilst this has some advantages, the results can be difficult to 
interpret, particularly in cases where the subject matter is complex and not well 
understood. Through the use of in-depth interviews, this study offers a unique 
perspective that it is hoped will contribute to a better understanding of the views of 
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police. The findings of this study will be of particular interest to other jurisdictions 
considering introducing similar schemes and may usefully inform the development 
of effective public policy in this area. 
 
Method 
 
Participants 
Participants were drawn from a specialist police squad responsible for 
coordinating the ongoing management, registration, and monitoring of sex offenders 
residing in the community, as well as managing the community notification scheme. 
Twenty-one police personnel (17 males, 4 females) volunteered to take part, which 
represented just over one-third of the entire squad. The sample was heterogeneous 
and was comprised of sworn officers of various ranks as well as a few unsworn 
officers. Participants had between three and nearly 40 years’ policing experience (M 
= 18.07 years, SD = 12.00). Tenure of employment within the squad ranged from 
five months to approximately eight years (when the squad was formed). The majority 
(81%) of participants were frontline staff who had regular contact with sex offenders 
as part of their role. Half were compliance officers, a role that entails managing a 
caseload of offenders and ensuring that they comply with their reporting obligations. 
The sample also included inquiry officers, whose primary responsibility is to locate 
missing offenders, officers with sole responsibility for managing those legally 
designated as ‘Dangerous Sexual Offenders’, an officer in a dedicated role 
responsible for managing the scheme, an intelligence analyst, and an administrator. 
Participants had between seven months and 11 years’ experience working with sex 
offenders (M = 4.61 years, SD = 3.09). 
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Design 
A qualitative research design utilising thematic analysis was deemed most 
appropriate in view of the exploratory nature of the study and relatively small pool 
from which to draw participants. Thematic analysis is a widely used method of 
qualitative analysis that involves identifying patterns of meaning across a dataset 
through a rigorous process of coding data and generating themes (Braun & Clarke, 
2006). Whilst the identification of themes is a component of many methods of 
qualitative analysis, such as grounded theory and phenomenological analysis, Braun 
and Clarke argue that it should be considered an analytic method in its own right. 
They contend that thematic analysis has a number of advantages over alternative 
approaches, including the fact that it is not tied to any particular theoretical or 
epistemological framework, and, as such, provides greater flexibility. 
 
Procedure 
An email was sent to all staff within the squad inviting them to take part in 
the study. Prospective participants were encouraged to contact the first author to find 
out more about the study and arrange a suitable time to be interviewed. Managerial 
staff also informally identified particular individuals who they believed would be 
good candidates on account of their knowledge, experience, or interest in research, 
and these individuals were approached in person and invited to take part. All 
prospective participants were made aware that participation was voluntary and 
provided informed, written consent. This study received clearance from the Deakin 
University Human Research Ethics Committee and the police agency’s research unit.  
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All interviews were conducted by the first author. Eighteen interviews were 
conducted in person at the participants’ workplace in April 2013 (six months after 
the scheme came into effect) and three interviews were conducted via telephone in 
August 2013 (these participants were not available at the time the face-to-face 
interviews were conducted). The interviews were semi-structured. This was deemed 
appropriate as there were no strong preconceptions regarding what issues or themes 
would emerge from the interviews. Broad open-ended questions were asked to elicit 
participants’ perceptions of the scheme. A conversational style of interviewing was 
adopted (Mason, 2002), which allowed the interviewer the freedom and flexibility to 
pursue lines of inquiry raised by participants. 
All interviews were audio-recorded and transcribed verbatim. After being 
double-checked for accuracy, the transcripts were imported into the software 
program NVivo10, which was used to organise and interrogate the data. The six 
phases of thematic analysis delineated by Braun and Clarke (2006) were followed. 
The first phase involved reading and re-reading the transcripts a number of times in 
order to gain familiarity with the data and formulate some initial ideas regarding 
patterns in the data. The transcripts were then systematically coded to identify 
interesting features of the data. The initial codes that were generated were collated 
and sorted into potential themes. The candidate themes were then reviewed and 
refined. This phase entailed two levels of review. The first involved reading the 
coded data extracts pertaining to each theme to check that they formed a coherent 
pattern. The second level of review involved re-reading all of the transcripts to check 
that the thematic map fit the data set as a whole and to code any data that was missed 
in the earlier coding phase. Following refinement of the themes, sub-themes were 
identified and the themes (and sub-themes) were defined and labelled. As no new 
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themes were generated from the analysis of the latter telephone interviews, data 
saturation was considered to have been reached (Bryman, 2012; Sim & Wright, 
2000). 
 
Analysis 
 
Four major themes emerged from the analysis. The first reflected the limited 
confidence that many participants had in the extent to which community notification 
is likely to meet its overarching aims, with the remaining three themes relating to 
concerns about the impact of notification on offenders, victims and the broader 
community, as well as the agency. Several subthemes were identified within each of 
the broader themes, which are discussed below. Quotations are provided to illustrate 
the themes. Detail that could potentially lead to the identification of individual 
participants was, however, removed from quotations and minor grammatical changes 
were made where appropriate to improve readability22. 
 
Limited Confidence in the Policy of Community Notification  
There was a widely held view among participants that the government 
developed the policy to garner public support. The police officers interviewed 
perceived that community notification had strong public support and believed that 
this was the impetus for its introduction. As one participant reflected, ‘The public 
wanted something and the government gave them something’ (Participant [P] 5). 
Another noted, ‘A commitment had been made [by the government] and they had to 
																																																						
22This includes changing the tense where appropriate.  
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follow it through’ (P1). Underlying this belief was scepticism as to whether the 
scheme would achieve its ostensible aim of increasing community safety. There 
were, however, suggestions that it could nonetheless lead to a perception among 
community members of increased safety. 
Few participants believed that the scheme would be an effective deterrent. 
Some opined that it might effectively deter some offenders, but that others would not 
be fazed if their details were published on the register. Participants specifically 
identified that the scheme would not effectively deter opportunistic offenders, 
Indigenous offenders living itinerant lifestyles, those with learning disabilities or 
substance use problems, and those without a support network or strong ties to the 
community. As one participant asserted: 
I think by and large most offenders who are going to re-offend are going to 
re-offend anyway and it’s irrelevant to them what’s out there and what the 
potential punishments are. . . . I don’t think it forms any form of deterrent for 
them. (P2)  
Furthermore, concern was expressed that the scheme could in fact increase some 
offenders’ risk of re-offending, with one participant asserting, ‘I think that it is going 
to drastically increase the rate of re-offending of our worst offenders’ (P19). This 
comment, and those relating to the deterrent effect (or otherwise) of the scheme, are 
indicative of a perception that its effectiveness may be moderated by offenders’ risk 
level, among other factors, and points to the need for flexible and discretionary 
application of the policy. 
There was a minority view that the scheme had the potential to be more 
effective if its scope were expanded. These participants believed that the scheme 
would have only a negligible impact on the rate of offending due to the fact that so 
	 60 
few offenders were subject to notification, and advocated expanding the narrow 
eligibility criteria. One participant, for example, opined:  
I think the way it’s been restricted so much…I don’t know why it was 
brought it. Decisions were made above my level, that to get on [the register] 
you have to have offended twice. There are people that have offended once 
that are absolute monsters that should be on there. (P8) 
Another suggested that the register should not be restricted to sex offenders, and 
should include other types of offenders, such as violent offenders and arsonists.  
 
Impact on Offenders 
Among the most common concerns raised by participants was that the 
scheme would negatively affect offenders’ psychological wellbeing, and 
consequently had the potential to inadvertently increase their risk. It was reported 
that in the months leading up to the scheme’s implementation, offenders were highly 
anxious about how it would affect them, with one participant describing offenders as 
‘panic-struck’ (P19). Participants identified that the stigma associated with being 
published on the register could produce feelings of shame and hopelessness, and 
thereby jeopardise offenders’ reintegration and rehabilitation. Concern was further 
expressed that this would increase the risk of depression and suicide. Indeed, one 
participant disclosed that some offenders had threatened to commit suicide if their 
details were published on the register. Another speculated that the experience of 
negative affect could lead to substance abuse, which is a recognised risk factor for 
offending. The following quotes are illustrative of these concerns:  
	 61 
There was a lot of fear; lots of phone calls; lots of stressed guys when it came 
out in the media that the government was looking at it. One guy I saw hadn’t 
slept and hadn’t eaten for about three days, and he looked like it as well. He 
was so stressed that he was going to go on the public register and that he 
would be outed in the community where he lived. . . . He sat and cried 
because he was so concerned about it. (P18) 
 
When the legislation was proposed, the first question that was on all their lips 
was, ‘Am I going to be on it?’ And the relief on their faces when they found 
out they weren’t; they were holding hands with their wives and saying, ‘Oh 
my god, I’m not going to be on there.’ They thought their lives were over. . . . 
That’s more scary [sic] to most people than going to jail, being on the public 
register, and having the shame of their face being on that website. (P10) 
Evidently, a major source of offenders’ anxiety surrounding the introduction 
of the scheme was fear of vigilantism. The police officers interviewed shared this 
concern, believing that the introduction of the scheme would lead to an increase in 
vigilantism. One participant recounted instances of vigilantism that preceded the 
introduction of the scheme, contending that incidents such as these would only 
become more common. Whilst it was noted that safeguards were in place to 
minimise the risk of vigilantism, many appeared to consider it an inevitable outcome. 
It was identified that an increase in vigilantism could result in difficulties finding 
suitable accommodation for offenders. This is significant as a lack of stable 
accommodation is a known risk factor for offending. Furthermore, it was recognised 
that vigilantism could also negatively impact offenders’ family members. Indeed, 
one participant perceived that this was offenders’ greatest concern in relation to the 
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introduction of the scheme. This could potentially place a strain on offenders’ 
relationships and jeopardise their social support, further compounding their stress 
and increasing their risk. The following examples highlight some of the concerns 
relating to vigilantism:  
I have a repeat serious sexual offender, all he’s ever done is offended within 
the family. . . He’s now on the public register. Now, somebody can look him 
up in their area and all of the sudden there’s a problem with it but the guy’s 
never actually offended outside his family so the concern is about what’s 
going on in and around his family and friends, not some stranger who decides 
to have a problem with him who’s seen his photo on the website and 
recognises him from the local search and then starts carrying on a series of 
vigilante-type actions where they’re outing him. . . and putting him under 
stress and pressure. Now, the moment you do that to the offender, they’re 
likely to re-offend. . . It’s not doing what it’s supposed to do, which is to 
protect; it’s actually increasing the risk of kids being offended against. (P2) 
 
We have a high profile guy who was released from prison recently. . . . 
Trying to house these people is very difficult. . . . We had to move this guy 
three times within four days because the media were aware of where he was 
going to be, so you can imagine that if his picture goes on there, then all the 
things that have been put in place to keep him safe and keep other people safe 
could be destroyed by his photo going on there. (P1) 
A related concern voiced by participants was that the introduction of the 
scheme would result in offenders going underground in an attempt to avoid being 
recognised and targeted. Indeed, it was reported that some offenders had threatened 
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to go underground prior to the scheme’s implementation. Participants cited evidence 
from the US suggesting that the introduction of community notification resulted in a 
decline in offenders’ compliance with reporting obligations, fearing that a similar 
decline would be seen in the jurisdiction in which they worked.  
I honestly think that it is going to force these people to go 
underground, and if they do go underground they will revert back 
[sic] to their original lifestyle, and will end up back on their offending 
cycles, and end up offending again against children. . . . There’s 
plenty of evidence that that is the case if they go unmanaged. (P19)  
 
Impact on Victims and the Broader Community 
Concern was expressed that increased awareness of the prevalence of sexual 
offending resulting from the introduction of the scheme would create fear and panic 
within the community and lead to hypervigilance, which was considered 
counterproductive. However, a more commonly cited concern was that the scheme 
would inadvertently create a false sense of security within the community. Those 
who raised this concern speculated that members of the public may become 
complacent about safety if the results of a local search do not indicate that any 
offenders live in their area or if they learn through the disclosure scheme that a 
person whom they were concerned about is not a registered sex offender. The 
following quotes capture these opposing concerns:  
It may well make people overly vigilant and thinking, ‘Well look how many 
[offenders] there are on there.’ That would be a concern. (P4) 
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It might give the public a false sense of security. If they look up [their 
address] and they see. . . that there is no-one listed, then they may be a little 
bit more lax on [sic] their kids – letting their kids go to the park, and thinking 
that they are safe. I’d like to think that parents didn’t think that way, but I’m 
sure there probably are some parents out there [who think like that]. (P18) 
It was noted that misconceptions regarding the scope of the scheme in general, and 
the local search function in particular, may contribute to a false sense of security 
insofar as members of the public may be under the impression that the local search 
identifies all registered sex offenders in their area, when this is not the case.  
A lot of the public think that every single sex offender is on the public 
website, and that’s misleading because they’re not. We’ve actually only got 
about 50 people on the public website out of 2,700, so it can lull people into a 
false sense of security. (P11) 
Indeed, the perception among some participants that the scheme may not deliver 
what the public wanted was based on a presumption that the public would want all 
registered sex offenders to be published on the register. Finally, concern was 
expressed that the scheme could lead to victims being identified, and that this could 
result in harmful consequences, such as victims committing suicide.  
 
Impact on the Agency  
A salient concern identified by participants related to the impact the scheme 
would have on their personal workload or that of the agency as a whole. It was noted 
that publishing offenders on the register is quite an involved process on account of 
the various approvals that must be sought. There was a belief among some 
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participants that the introduction of the scheme would inhibit management of 
offenders, adding to the demands of their role. These participants commented that 
having to protect offenders from vigilantism and respond to such incidents would 
expand and complicate their role. This may necessitate a paradigm shift for police, 
who may view their primary role as protecting the interests of victims and the 
community23. One participant identified that the agency could be held liable if 
offenders are victimised by vigilantes, which could give rise to offenders instituting 
legal proceedings against the agency. One of the measures introduced to manage the 
risk of vigilantism is the development of individualised ‘extraction plans’ to be 
enacted by offenders in the event they are victimised. It was noted that there was a 
significant amount of work involved in creating these plans as a new plan must be 
devised each time an offender moves address. Finally, participants expressed concern 
regarding the financial cost involved in implementing and maintaining the scheme, 
with some questioning whether this was optimal use of limited resources.  
It’s costing millions of dollars to put together, millions of dollars, and 
millions of dollars to run, with all the staff that we have in place and things 
like that, and it’s just not well spent in my opinion. (P13) 
 
[We’ve] got to provide staffing for it and resources, so there is a definite 
impact on the agency. (P21) 
 
The offenders…were obviously all apprehensive about it when it was first 
mentioned and as it became more and more public that it was coming, they 
																																																						
23Although it is recognised that any offender who is targeted by vigilantes is themselves a victim, the 
police may not view them as such.  
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all had concerns and a lot of our time was being wasted on, if you like, trying 
to calm them down. (P9) 
  
We have to have . . . extraction plans in place. They have to be kept up-to-
date . . .  [It’s a] massive amount of work because some of our offenders 
move every couple of weeks – you have an extraction plan in place for one 
address, then they move and you’ve got to do it all again for [their new 
address], and then they move again and you’ve got to do it all over. So it does 
generate a lot of work. (P11) 
 
Discussion 
 
The aim of this study was to report the perspectives of those police officers 
who are responsible for administering Australia’s first community notification 
scheme. Given their expertise in managing sex offenders, and their pivotal role in the 
scheme’s implementation, these professionals are uniquely placed to identify 
potential policy implementation issues and possible unintended consequences. 
Whilst the perspectives of those involved in the implementation of a policy is no 
substitute for hard outcome data, they are nonetheless an important consideration in 
evaluating the overall utility of a policy. As Day and colleagues (Day, Carson, 
Newton, & Hobbs, 2014) suggest, practice-based wisdom can be used to augment 
objective outcome measures, particularly where the available evidence is limited or 
equivocal, as is the case for the evidence base for community notification. There is at 
present no outcome data on the effectiveness of the Australian scheme given that it is 
in its infancy. However, even when ‘hard’ data do become available, any analysis is 
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unlikely to be conclusive – community notification was introduced in the US over 
two decades ago and still the evidence remains somewhat equivocal (see Whitting et 
al., 2014).  
Many of those interviewed were sceptical as to whether the scheme would 
achieve its ostensible aim of increasing community safety. However, there was a 
suggestion that community members might nonetheless perceive that they were 
safer, which could be beneficial in its own right. As Petrunik (2003) has suggested, 
community protection measures targeting sex offenders may be ‘more symbolic than 
instrumental in nature, their essential purpose being to address public fear’ (p. 61). It 
is noteworthy that there was a widely held belief among participants that the policy 
was developed to garner public support. Concern was expressed, however, that the 
perception of increased safety would be counter-productive if it created a false sense 
of security. For example, preoccupation with only those who are identified on the 
register could inadvertently divert attention away from those who pose a genuine 
risk. On the other hand, some participants speculated that it could create fear and 
panic within the community, which equally would be of concern. The international 
evidence in relation to this is mixed: whilst some studies have found that community 
notification provides reassurance to the public (e.g., Anderson & Sample, 2008; 
Boyle, Ragusa-Salerno, Marcus, Passannante, & Furrer, 2013; Katz-Schiavone & 
Jeglic, 2009; Lieb & Nunlist, 2008; Phillips, 1998), others have found that it has 
precisely the opposite effect, creating fear and anxiety (e.g., Beck, Clingermayer, 
Ramsey, & Travis, 2004; Beck & Travis, 2004, 2006; Kemshall & Wood, 2010; 
Zevitz & Farkas, 2000a).  
The results of a recent study exploring community attitudes towards the 
Australian scheme are informative. Taylor, Edwards, Collier, and Gringart (2014) 
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conducted an online survey of members of the public (N = 162) who accessed the 
public register within a 5-month period. Twice as many respondents did not agree 
with the statement ‘This website makes me feel safer’ than the number who did 
(46.9% either strongly disagreed or disagreed, whereas 22.9% either strongly agreed 
or agreed with the statement). There was a slightly higher rate of agreement with the 
statement ‘This website makes the community safer’; however, again, a greater 
proportion of respondents disagreed (40.1% disagreed whereas 29.7% agreed). These 
findings indicate that the community has responded to the introduction of the scheme 
in idiosyncratic ways, and, as such, it is plausible that it has allayed anxiety in some 
whilst heightening anxiety in others. 
A parallel may be drawn with the findings of the current study. Participants 
believed that the scheme could deter some offenders from re-offending but could 
inadvertently increase the risk of others. It may be inferred from this finding that 
these professionals would support a more flexible application of the policy that 
affords greater discretionary power. Consistent with this conclusion, several 
participants opined that there should be a provision allowing offenders who have 
been compliant and who have successfully completed treatment and are no longer 
considered a risk to be exempt from being listed on the register despite meeting the 
relevant criteria24. On the other hand, one participant believed that some offenders 
who have offended only once should be on the register despite not meeting the 
criteria25.  
																																																						
24There is a provision in the legislation that allows offenders to appeal the decision to publish their 
details on the register. Only the Commissioner of Police (the highest authority within the police force) 
has the authority to deem an offender who meets the relevant criteria exempt from publication.  
 
25There is a provision in the legislation that allows the Minister to authorise the publication of the 
photograph and locality of any offender who has been found guilty of an offence punishable by 
imprisonment for five years or more, who is deemed to pose a risk to the community. 
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The relevant legislation stipulates that consideration should be given to 
whether publishing an offender’s details could elevate their risk or affect their 
compliance with reporting obligations. It is not clear what factors the police take into 
account when making this determination, and whether the decision to publish or not 
is informed by evidence. One participant suggested that a risk assessment tool should 
be developed to guide decision-making in this regard. Whilst this suggestion 
certainly has merit, there is limited available research to inform the development of 
such a tool, and their validity has been challenged in a number of court cases 
involving serious offenders.  
The main limitation of this study is that it offers only one perspective – that 
of police officers who are responsible for administering the scheme – and necessarily 
reflects only the views of this group. The findings of this study are nonetheless 
largely consistent with those of a recent study exploring the views of other 
professionals who work with sex offenders in the same jurisdiction. Day et al. (2014) 
conducted interviews with psychologists and staff from non-government 
organisations that provide support services to sex offenders living in the community. 
Whilst these interviews explored attitudes toward sex offender public policy and risk 
management more generally, they were conducted shortly after the scheme came into 
effect and this was a key discussion point. Day et al. reported that these professionals 
believed that the scheme was detrimental to offenders’ rehabilitation and considered 
it to be of limited or no benefit to the community. The consistency of views is 
significant given the different backgrounds and paradigms within which these 
professionals work.  
The results of this study highlight that the police officers responsible for 
administering the scheme share a number of reservations regarding its potential 
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impact. It is important to note, however, that the participants were primarily self-
selecting and, as such, it is also possible that the sample was not representative of all 
officers in the squad even though the sample was of a reasonable size given the size 
of the squad and a range of different staff groups participated. The fact remains that 
there is strong public support for community notification and history would suggest 
that mounting public pressure may be difficult to ignore. The conclusion of this study 
is that legislators and policymakers responding to public demand for community 
notification would be well advised to consider developing legislation and policy in 
this area that allows those tasked with enforcement the flexibility to implement 
notification schemes in such a way as to maximise effectiveness. The question of 
how best to maximise effectiveness remains the subject of future research 
endeavours. A useful direction for future research would be to identify those factors 
or conditions that are likely to optimise – or hinder – effectiveness. This is unlikely 
to lead to a straightforward conclusion that can be easily translated into broad, 
universal policy and practice recommendations.  
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CHAPTER 4: STUDY 2 
 
This chapter presents the second empirical study. The results of the first study 
presented in Chapter 3 guided the focus of this study.	This study, which has been 
accepted for publication in the journal of Psychiatry, Psychology and Law (see 
Whitting, Day, & Powell, in press)26, sought to better understand the impact of the 
scheme from the perspective of the police who have been responsible for its 
administration, and more specifically, to determine whether their main concerns 
reported in the first study had been realised. It integrates an analysis of the in-depth 
interviews conducted with police officers with an analysis of official quantitative and 
qualitative data provided by the police agency.	
	 In 1990 the Washington State Legislature enacted a bill introducing a raft of 
new measures targeting sex offenders. These included provision to release 
information about known sex offenders to the general public, or what is termed 
‘community notification’ (but popularly known as ‘Megan’s Law’; Lasher & 
McGrath, 2012; Meloy, Saleh, & Wolff, 2007). In quick succession, other states 
followed Washington’s lead (Logan, 2011); often as a response to community 
lobbying in the wake of high-profile sex crimes against children (Levenson, 2003; 
Petrunik, 2003; Thompson & Greek, 2010). Significant pressure to adopt community 
notification legislation was also applied at the federal level, with states being 
penalised financially for failing to do so (Levenson, 2003; Meloy et al., 2007; 
Thompson & Greek, 2010). Since 2003 all states have been federally mandated to 
maintain a publicly accessible online sex offender register which feeds into a 
																																																						
26Whitting, L., Day, A., & Powell, M. (in press). An evaluation of the impact of Australia’s first 
community notification scheme. Psychiatry, Psychology and Law. Note the formatting of this chapter 
is consistent with the journal’s specifications. 
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national register (Appelbaum, 2008; Levenson, D'Amora, & Hern, 2007). The 
information that is made available to the public varies from state to state, but 
typically includes the offender’s name, photograph and physical description, date of 
birth, address, and details of past convictions at the very least (see Ackerman, Harris, 
Levenson & Zgoba, 2011 for a descriptive analysis of the content of state-based 
online sex offender registries). 
Other countries have been much slower to adopt these measures. Until recent 
years, the only country other than the United States (US) to have implemented a 
community notification scheme was South Korea (Logan, 2011; Vess, Langskaill, 
Day, Powell, & Graffam, 2011)27. In the United Kingdom (UK), however, public 
campaigning for community notification gained significant momentum following the 
highly publicised abduction and murder of an eight-year-old girl, Sarah Payne, by a 
convicted sex offender in 2000 (Dean, 2000; Logan, 2011). Although the Home 
Office resisted sustained media and community pressure to introduce a public sex 
offender register akin to those that existed in the US, it did introduce a ‘limited 
disclosure’ scheme in 2010 (Kemshall & Wood, 2010; see also Kemshall, Kelly, & 
Wilkinson, 2012; Kemshall & Weaver, 2012). Shortly thereafter, the Scottish 
Government followed suit, introducing an almost identical scheme (Chan, Homes, 
Murray, & Treanor, 2010). Under both schemes, parents and guardians28 can enquire 
about a particular individual who has unsupervised contact with their child or 
children. If the subject of an application is found to be a registered sex offender, 
police are authorised to disclose this to the applicant. 
																																																						
27A few Canadian provinces practice community notification but the federal government has thus far 
resisted pressure to enact federal legislation authorising community notification (Logan, 2011; 
Petrunik, 2003; Vess et al., 2011).  
 
28The scheme was later expanded in England and Wales to allow anyone with caretaking 
responsibilities for a child to make an application.  
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In 2012, one Australian state became the first jurisdiction in Australasia to 
introduce community notification. This fulfilled an election promise made in 
response to prolonged public outcry following the highly publicised 2006 sexual 
homicide of a seven-year-old girl (Trenwith, 2012, March 8). The scheme is broader 
than those implemented in the UK, but more limited and controlled than those that 
operate in the US, comprising a ‘three-tiered’ scheme that incorporates elements of 
both. The first ‘tier’ pertains to offenders who have failed to comply with their 
reporting obligations or who have provided false or misleading information, and 
whose whereabouts are unknown to police. Their name, gender, date of birth, a 
physical description and a photograph is published on an online register that can be 
viewed by anyone. The second ‘tier’ allows members of the public to perform a 
search that will return the photographs of dangerous, high-risk and recidivist 
offenders who reside in close proximity to them. The criteria are restrictive and 
capture only a small proportion (less than 5%) of registered sex offenders. The third 
‘tier’ was modelled on the schemes introduced in the UK and allows parents and 
guardians to enquire whether a particular individual who has unsupervised contact 
with their child or children is a registered sex offender. 
In one of the few analyses of this Australian initiative, Whitting, Day, and 
Powell (2016) conducted in-depth interviews with 21 specialist police officers 
employed in the squad responsible for managing the scheme shortly after it came 
into effect. Those interviewed voiced a wide range of concerns, relating to the 
scheme’s possible impact on the agency, offenders, victims and the broader 
community. They expressed concern that the introduction of the scheme would 
significantly increase workload, that it would impact adversely on offenders’ 
psychological wellbeing, that it would lead to vigilantism, and potentially reduce 
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offenders’ compliance with reporting obligations. The current study sought to better 
understand how police officers view the actual impact of the scheme and, more 
specifically, determine whether these concerns have been realised. Descriptive data 
on the operation of the scheme are reported, including a demographic profile of those 
subject to notification, to contextualise and aid the interpretation of the analysis. The 
findings of this study may usefully inform the development of policy and practice in 
other jurisdictions that are considering introducing community notification.  
 
Method 
 
Design and Procedure 
A mixed methods design (see Creswell, 2014; Tashakkori & Teddlie, 2010) 
was used in this study. Interview data with police officers working in the squad 
responsible for managing the scheme were supplemented with quantitative and 
qualitative data recorded in police databases. This design was deemed most 
appropriate as some of the research questions lent themselves to a qualitative 
approach whereas others could not be adequately addressed with qualitative data 
alone. Clearance for this project was received from a university Human Research 
Ethics Committee and the police agency research unit. 
Interviews. An email was sent to all staff within the squad inviting them to 
take part in an interview. Prospective participants were encouraged to contact the 
first author to find out more about the study and to arrange a suitable time to be 
interviewed. Managerial staff also informally identified particular individuals who 
they believed would be good candidates on account of their knowledge, experience, 
or interest in research and these individuals were approached in person and invited to 
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take part. All prospective participants were made aware that participation was 
voluntary and provided informed, written consent. 
All interviews were conducted by the first author. Eighteen interviews were 
conducted in person at the participants’ workplace in April 2013 (six months after 
the scheme came into effect) and three interviews were conducted via telephone in 
August 2013 (these participants were not available at the time the face-to-face 
interviews were conducted). The interviews were semi-structured. Broad open-ended 
questions were asked to elicit participants’ perceptions of the scheme. A 
conversational style of interviewing was adopted, which allowed the interviewer the 
freedom and flexibility to pursue lines of inquiry raised by participants (see Mason, 
2002). 
All interviews were audio-recorded and transcribed verbatim. After being 
double-checked for accuracy, the transcripts were imported into the software 
program NVivo10, which was used to organise and interrogate the data. The six 
phases of thematic analysis delineated by Braun and Clarke (2006) were followed. 
Quotations are provided to illustrate key themes that emerged from the data. Detail 
that could potentially lead to the identification of individual participants was, 
however, removed from quotations and minor grammatical changes were made 
where appropriate to improve readability. 
Data extraction. The police agency provided de-identified quantitative and 
qualitative data that are routinely collected as part of their usual data collection and 
reporting practices, in addition to data in relation to the community notification 
scheme that were specifically requested for this study. The data were extracted from 
various internal databases and Google Analytics (a web analytics tool that tracks 
website traffic). Data linkage and cleaning was initially performed in Excel. The data 
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were provided in password protected Excel files. The primary dataset comprised 
2,047 of the 2,426 offenders (84.38%) who committed an offence that resulted in 
them becoming a ‘reportable offender’29 prior to 1 September 201330 and contained 
demographic and offence-related variables for all recorded convictions between 1 
January 1998 and 30 June 2014. The dataset originally contained 17,006 rows, where 
each row represented an offence, although each offence could have multiple counts. 
The data were then manually imported into IBM SPSS Statistics, Version 23 for the 
purposes of further data cleaning and analysis. The data were aggregated such that 
each row represented an offender, rather than an offence, which reduced the total 
number of rows to 2,047. 
 
Participants 
 Participants were drawn from a specialist police squad responsible for 
coordinating the ongoing management, registration, and monitoring of sex offenders 
residing in the community, as well as managing the community notification scheme. 
Twenty-one police personnel (17 males, 4 females) volunteered to take part in an 
interview, which represented just over one-third of the entire squad. The sample was 
heterogeneous and was comprised of sworn officers of various ranks as well as a few 
unsworn officers. Participants had between three and nearly 40 years’ policing 
experience (M = 18.07 years, SD = 12.00). Tenure of employment within the squad 
																																																						
29A ‘reportable offender’ is a person whom a court sentences for a reportable offence. The list of 
reportable offences includes sexual and other serious offences against a child, as well as select serious 
sexual offences against an adult and serious non-sexual offences against an adult if the person has 
prior convictions of a similar nature. Reportable offenders are required to register their personal 
details with police within seven days of their release into the community from custody or court, report 
to the police at regular intervals, and update the police with any changes in their personal 
circumstances, including change of address, employment and relationship status, club memberships, 
vehicle registration, carriage service providers, email addresses, and online user profiles. See Vess et 
al. (2011) for a more detailed explanation of reporting requirements.  
 
30Data were not available for 379 offenders. 
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ranged from five months to approximately eight years (when the squad was formed). 
The majority (81%) of participants were frontline staff who had regular contact with 
sex offenders as part of their role. Half were compliance officers, a role that entails 
managing a caseload of offenders and ensuring that they comply with their reporting 
obligations. The sample also included inquiry officers, whose primary responsibility 
is to locate missing offenders, officers with sole responsibility for managing those 
legally designated as ‘Dangerous Sexual Offenders’, an officer in a dedicated role 
responsible for managing the scheme, an intelligence analyst, and an administrator. 
Participants had between seven months and 11 years’ experience working with sex 
offenders (M = 4.61 years, SD = 3.09).  
 
Results 
 
 The results section is divided into five subsections. The first presents some 
basic descriptive data and a demographic profile of those who have been subject to 
notification. The remaining subsections are centred around four key concerns 
reported by Whitting et al. (2016): the impact of the introduction of the scheme on 
the workload of the police; on offenders’ psychological wellbeing; vigilantism; and 
offenders’ compliance with their reporting obligations.  
 
What are the characteristics of offenders subject to notification?  
In total, 39 offenders were subject to tier one notification between 15 October 
2012 (when the website went live) and 27 February 201531. Of these, six were 
																																																						
31The actual number of offenders subject to tier one notification may be slightly higher on account of 
the fact that the dataset only included those who became a reportable offender prior to 1 September 
2013. It is possible that a small number of individuals who became reportable offenders after this date 
were subject to tier one notification.  
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subject to tier one notification on more than one occasion during this period (four 
offenders were subject to notification on two separate occasions and two offenders 
were subject to notification on four occasions). As at 27 February 2015 six offenders 
remained on the missing offenders register (i.e., tier one)32. Excluding these 
offenders, those subject to tier one notification were published on the register for 
between one day and 740 days (M = 54.40 days, SD = 116.11).  
Within this same period, 86 offenders were determined to meet the tier two 
criteria and thus potentially subject to notification (as notification in this case is 
contingent upon a member of the public who resides in the same locality as the 
offender performing a local search)33. Five of these offenders were also subject to 
tier one notification (which involves the release of more personal details about the 
offender) for a period of time. As at 27 February 2015, only one offender had been 
subject to tier three notification (see Table 2 for further information).  
Table 1 compares offenders subject to notification (broken down by tier) with 
those not subject to notification on a range of demographic variables: age; gender; 
Indigenous status34; relationship status; Dangerous Sexual Offender (DSO)35 status; 
risk level according to the Risk Matrix 2000 ([RM2000] Thornton et al., 2003), the 
risk assessment tool used by the police agency; and the period of time that the 
offender must comply with legislative requirements governing registered reportable 
offenders (this is prescribed by legislation). Where appropriate, significance tests are 
																																																						
 
32As above, the dataset from which this figure was derived only included those who became a 
reportable offender prior to 1 September 2013.  
 
33As per footnote 5, the actual number of offenders subject to tier two notification may be slightly 
higher on account of the fact that the dataset only included those who became a reportable offender 
prior to 1 September 2013. 
 
34Derived from the offender’s stated ethnicity and their ethnic appearance recorded by police. 
 
35A person whom a court has found poses a serious danger to the community as per relevant 
legislation.    
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reported comparing those subject to tier one notification with those not subject to 
notification of any kind, and those subject to tier two notification with those not 
subject to notification of any kind36. 
Levene’s test of homogeneity of variance indicated that the variances in age 
for the group subject to tier one notification and the group not subject to notification 
were unequal, F(1, 1,947) = 11.87, p < .001. In light of this, a non-parametric Mann-
Whitney test was conducted to test the relationship between age and tier one 
notification. This revealed that those subject to tier one notification were 
significantly younger (Mdn = 31.72 years) than those not subject to notification 
(Mdn = 42.83 years), U = 25,268.00, z = -3.51, p < .001, r = -.08. The assumption of 
homogeneity of variance was met for the comparison between the group subject to 
tier two notification and the group not subject to notification, F(1, 1988) = 0.30, p 
= .58. An independent-samples t-test revealed that there was no significant difference 
in age between those subject to tier two notification (M = 44.3 years) and those not 
subject to notification (M = 44.4 years), t(2,011) = -0.11, p = .91. 
The distribution of registration length violated the assumptions of normality37 
and homogeneity of variance38. As such, separate Mann-Whitney tests were 
conducted to test the significance of the relationship between registration length and 
notification. Offenders subject to tier one notification had a significantly longer 
																																																						
36It was not possible to compare those subject to tier one notification with those subject to tier two 
notification due to the fact that this would violate the assumption of independence (as five offenders 
were subject to both tier one and tier two notification). 
	
37Separate Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests were conducted to test the assumption of normality. As this test 
is known to be highly sensitive, a probability value of p < .001 was used. The distribution of 
registration length was non normal for those subject to tier one notification, D(39) = 0.43, p < .001 
(Zskewness = 3.62, p < .001, Zkurtosis = 4.02, p < .001), those subject to tier two notification, D(80) = 0.38, 
p < .001 (Zskewness = 1.60, p = ns, Zkurtosis = -1.65, p = ns), and those not subject to notification, 
D(1,910) = 0.41, p < .001 (skewness = 6.57, kurtosis = 45.79). 
 
38 The variances in registration length were unequal for both the group subject to tier one notification, 
F(1, 1,947) = 109.58, p < .001, and the group subject to tier two notification, F(1, 1988) = 915.42, p  
< .001.	
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period of registration (Mdn = 15.00) compared to those not subject to notification 
(Mdn = 15.00), U = 27,566.00, z = -3.30, p < .001, r = -.07, as did offenders subject 
to tier two notification (Mdn = 100.00), U = 26,465.00, z = -11.62, p < .001, r = -.26.  
Pearson’s chi-square or Fisher’s exact tests were performed, where 
appropriate, to test the significance of the relationship between each of the 
categorical variables and notification. The small number of females and DSOs 
resulted in a violation of the chi-square assumption that the expected frequency of 
each cell should be greater than 5 (Field, 2009). For both gender and DSO status, one 
cell of the 2 X 2 contingency table comparing those subject to tier one notification 
with those not subject to notification was below 1. As such, significance testing was 
not appropriate as there is no test or correction that is suitable in instances where the 
expected frequency for a cell is less than 1 (Campbell, 2007). For both gender and 
DSO status, all cells of the 2 X 2 contingency table comparing those subject to tier 
two notification with those not subject to notification were greater than 1. Campbell 
(2007) recommends Fisher’s exact test when all cells have an expected frequency 
greater than 1 but at least one cell has an expected frequency below 5. For the 
analysis of gender, Fisher’s exact test was not significant (p = 1.00), which indicates 
that the null hypothesis that gender and tier two notification are independent should 
be retained. However, for the analysis of DSO status, Fisher’s exact test was 
significant (p < .001), indicating that there is a relationship between DSO status and 
tier two notification. Examination of the frequencies indicated that DSOs had an 
increased probability of being subject to tier two notification. 
Separate chi-square tests revealed that there was a significant association 
between Indigenous status and both tier one notification, c2 (1) = 46.71, p < .001, ɸ 
= .16, and tier two notification, c2 (1) = 22.53, p < .001, ɸ = .11. Indigenous 
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offenders were 6.91 times more likely to be subject to tier one notification and 2.94 
times more likely to be subject to tier two notification than non-Indigenous 
offenders. In view of the fact that risk level can be considered an ordinal variable 
with four levels, the chi-square for linearity was computed by subtracting the ordinal 
(linear) chi-square value from the Pearson chi-square value (see Agresti, 2007, 2013; 
Howell, 2013). For both sets of comparisons (tier 1 vs. no notification and tier 2 vs. 
no notification), one cell (12.5%) had an expected frequency of less than 5; however, 
this was deemed to be acceptable given that the ordinal chi-square is less sensitive to 
the negative effects of small sample size (Agresti, 2007, 2013; Howell, 2013). 
Furthermore, it is generally considered “acceptable in larger contingency tables to 
have up to 20% of expected frequencies below 5” (Field, 2009, p. 692), provided that 
all expected frequencies are greater than 1, which was the case for both comparisons. 
The association between risk level and tier one notification was significant, c2 (2) = 
6.65, p < .05, as was the association between risk level and tier two notification, c2 
(2) = 66.57, p < .001. Offenders subject to notification (be it tier one or tier two) 
were higher risk than those not subject to notification. The effect sizes indicate that 
the relationship between risk and tier one notification was small whilst the 
relationship between risk and tier two notification was moderate (Cramer’s V = .14 
and .35 respectively; Cohen, 1988). 
It was deemed inappropriate to test the significance of the association 
between relationship status and notification in light of the substantial proportion of 
cases (30.09%) missing relationship status, and Little’s MCAR test result indicating 
that the data were not missing completely at random, c2 (74) = 1,194.68, p < .001.  
 
  
	 82 
Table 1 
Comparison of Offenders Subject to Notification with Offenders Not Subject to 
Notification  
 Subject to notification Not subject to 
notification 
(n = 1,927) 
 Tier 1 
(n = 39) 
Tier 2 
(n = 86) 
Mean agea 34.7*** 44.3 44.1 
Gender (% male) 100.0 98.8 98.3 
Indigenous status (% 
Indigenous)b 
56.4*** 34.9*** 15.5 
Relationship status (% 
ever married/de facto)c 
48.3 45.9 51.9 
DSO status (% DSO) 0.0 30.2*** 1.2d 
Risk levele  
     Low (%) 
     Medium (%) 
     High (%) 
     Very High (%) 
 
5.1 
48.7 
25.6 
20.5 
 
1.2 
22.9 
37.3 
38.6 
 
28.8 
52.9 
14.6 
3.8 
Mean registration 
length (years) 
27.4*** 66.7*** 14.5 
Note. DSO = persons legally designated as Dangerous Sexual Offenders pursuant to 
relevant legislation.  
aAs at 27 February 2015. bDerived from the offender’s stated ethnicity and their 
ethnic appearance recorded by police. cAt the time of sentencing. Note, a substantial 
proportion of cases (30.09%) had missing data. As such, these figures should be 
interpreted with caution. dThese individuals were not subject to notification despite 
being DSOs because there was a suppression order in place or they were returned to 
custody. eMost current risk level according to the Risk Matrix 2000 (Thornton et al., 
2003), the risk assessment tool used by the police agency.  
*** p < .001 
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Has the introduction of the scheme significantly increased the workload of the 
police who are responsible for managing it?  
 The police officers interviewed who were directly involved in the 
implementation of the scheme reported that it created a fairly substantial amount of 
work in the development of new policies, processes, and procedures. The roll out of 
tier two was identified as being particularly labour intensive on account of the fact it 
had to be determined which offenders should be subject to notification and the 
necessary approvals had to be sought. This view is encapsulated in the quote below. 
There’s quite a lot of work that’s gotta be done to put a person on tier two... 
It’s quite an involved process to put [forward] the application for the 
Assistant Commissioner to sign, and we can’t put anyone on there without 
the approval of the Assistant Commissioner, and you have to go through that 
step with every single person. (P5) 
 Those involved in the scheme’s implementation reported that they were 
inundated with enquiries when the website was launched, the vast majority of which 
related to the local search function (i.e., tier two). One participant who had oversight 
for the scheme’s implementation informed that four to five staff were employed on a 
full-time basis during the implementation phase to manage the influx of enquiries. It 
was, however, noted that the workload associated with tier two was much reduced 
due to streamlining and automation of processes, coupled with a significant decline 
in the volume of enquiries received. Similarly, the workload associated with tier 
three was noted to be considerably less than anticipated on account of the fact that so 
few applications had been received. According to one participant (P5), “an influx” of 
up to 50 applications was expected. At the time the interviews were conducted, only 
four applications had been received, none of which led to a disclosure.  
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We anticipated it would [increase our workload]. We anticipated that that’s 
what would happen, and we got more staff to cater for that, but it just didn’t 
eventuate because so much of it was going to be based upon the applications 
from the community to get the information on these people that have access 
to their kids, and that’s just not working because it’s too complicated, so 
we’ve had very few applications. (P19) 
Indeed, underlying these observations was a perception that the scheme as a 
whole, but particularly the disclosure scheme (tier three), was under-utilised by the 
public. There was a divergence of opinion with respect to the extent to which this 
was viewed as a positive or negative outcome. On the one hand, participants 
expressed relief that the volume of enquiries and applications was significantly less 
than projected, insofar as their concerns regarding increased workload had not come 
to fruition. On the other hand, a minority of participants expressed disappointment in 
the public response, with some opining that the scheme could be better promoted. 
The perceived low uptake of the scheme led some to question whether the 
investment of resources was justified.  
When [the website] was first launched in October last year, there were God 
knows how many hits on the website; inundated on day one, and then day 
two there were still a lot, and day three not a lot – it was out of the news; it 
wasn’t topical anymore; it wasn’t the thing of the moment. And then 
everything that we thought would come out of it actually dropped off, and 
people don’t actually have that much interest in it anymore. (P11) 
 
I don’t know how many people have actually looked at the public register, 
but I know the figures are quite low…And it’s been publicised through the 
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media so I don’t really know what more you can do, but it’s only as good as 
the people that look at it, that’s the unfortunate thing. (P17) 
 
I think it’s a total waste of time…I think the public really haven’t shown that 
much interest in it…I don’t think there’s been a lot of searches on there, 
enough that warrant it to be, say, successful from that side of it.  (P14)  
 By the time the interviews were conducted, only two full-time staff remained 
in dedicated roles with responsibility for managing the scheme. The introduction of 
the scheme was perceived to have had a minimal impact on the day-to-day workload 
of those not directly involved in its implementation or operation. The impacts most 
commonly cited by those without direct involvement were having to allay offenders’ 
anxieties when it first came into effect, having to notify offenders subject to 
notification pursuant to tier two, and creating ‘extraction plans’ for these offenders, 
to be enacted in the event of vigilantism.   
It has caused a little bit extra work, but not as much as I actually thought it 
would do… Initially, when it first came out we had quite a few people who 
were going on to the tier two as part of our team, so I had to work with a 
couple of extraction plans, just the paperwork side of it, that sort of stuff. It 
just caused a little more work, but nothing overly hard. (P15) 
 
I don’t know that it’s really had any [impact] at all. No, I mean, at first they 
thought it would create a lot of work but it hasn’t. (P20) 
The data provided by the police agency indicated that there were 182,475 hits 
to the community notification website between 15 October 2012 (when it went live) 
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and 27 February 2015. Over this period, 36,837 tier two searches were performed39 
and 892 enquiries or requests for assistance were received (542 via the website and 
350 via email), the vast majority of which were in relation to tier two. It is not known 
how many telephone enquiries were received as no record is kept of these. 
Unfortunately, as only the total number of hits, searches, and enquiries were 
provided, it was not possible to examine trends in usage over time.  
 Ten tier three applications had been received as at 27 February 2015; 
however, two of these were duplicates of previously submitted applications and one 
was withdrawn because the applicant discovered through other means that the person 
of interest (an associate of her ex-husband) was a convicted sex offender. As can be 
seen from Table 2 below, the seven applications that proceeded took between one 
and 13 days to finalise (M = 5.86 days, SD = 5.30). Only one of the persons of 
interest was found to be a reportable offender, and this was disclosed to the applicant 
in writing.  
 Overall, whilst the scheme was evidently resource-intensive to implement, 
with the exception of two staff members in dedicated roles, it does not appear to have 
had a significant impact on the day-to-day workload of staff. The smaller than 
anticipated impact may be explained by the apparent low uptake of the scheme and, 
in particular, the small number of tier three applications received.  
 
  
																																																						
39A further 11,913 searches were initiated but not completed.  
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Table 2 
Tier Three Applications Received as at 27 February 2015 
Applicant’s relationship 
to child 
Applicant’s 
relationship to person 
of interest 
Outcome of 
application 
Time taken 
to finalise  
Mother 
Ex-husband’s brother 
(i.e., ex-brother-in-law) 
Not a RO 1 day 
Father 
Current partner of 
applicant’s mother 
Not a RO 1 day 
Mother Applicant’s father Not a RO 3 days 
Not a parent/guardiana 
Unrelated (POI was a 
scout leader) 
Not a RO 2 days 
Mother 
An associate of              
ex-husband 
Withdrawn N/A 
Mother Ex-partner Not a RO 12 days 
Father 
Ex-wife’s current 
husband 
Not a RO 9 days 
Father 
Ex-wife’s father 
(i.e., ex-father-in-law) 
POI was a RO. 
Disclosure made 
13 days 
Note. RO = reportable offender.  
aThis person was not eligible to make an application as they were not the parent or 
guardian of a child or children.  
 
 
Has the scheme adversely impacted offenders’ psychological wellbeing?  
 The introduction of the scheme was evidently anxiety provoking for many 
offenders, with participants reporting that they were “inundated” (P6) with enquiries 
from distressed offenders when the scheme first came into effect. Several 
participants remarked that the offenders who seemed most anxious about it were 
those who were not subject to notification (at least not tiers one or two).  
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There were a lot of questions from offenders when it was being talked about. 
They all thought they were going to be on [the public register]. That caused a 
lot of panic amongst them. The ones who’d been reporting for 6-7 years, 
never had an issue, never offended since, they were all getting in a bit of a 
panic. But we knew pretty early it wasn’t going to be that vast; it was going 
to be a narrow group of people. (P1) 
 
Psychologically, it’s had an impact on the offenders because they were all 
very concerned leading up to the introduction of it. I know they were very 
concerned and we were getting inundated with phone calls, but that was 
through ignorance on their behalf as to what was actually going to happen. 
But it was having a big impact on them. There were people talking about 
topping themselves and moving interstate. (P6)  
It would appear that the distress and anxiety reportedly experienced by 
offenders was produced – or exacerbated – by misinformation surrounding the 
scheme and uncertainty on the part of offenders regarding how the scheme would 
affect them. It emerged from the interviews that there was a widely held 
misconception among offenders (and indeed members of the general public) that the 
scheme was akin to those that exist in the US. Participants speculated that media 
misreporting created and perpetuated this misconception, which led to offenders 
wrongly assuming that they would be identified on the public register. Participants 
reported that providing offenders with a full explanation of the scheme, responding 
to their queries, and, where appropriate, providing reassurance that the scheme was 
unlikely to affect them, often allayed their anxieties.  
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A lot of offenders lost sleep prior to being explained to what it was all about, 
because there’s always a media misconception. Once most of them had it 
explained to them they were like, “Yeah cool, I’m not going on it.” That was 
the biggest issue for most who weren’t going on it; the thought they may do. 
(P15) 
 
I think initially a lot of them thought, “Oh, we’re straight going to be 
published, our picture is going to be out there, everyone is going to know 
where we live.” But once it’s explained how they can end up there, either by 
whereabouts unknown or reoffending, then I think they’re quite fine with it, a 
lot of them, because they know that…they won’t end up on there. (P7) 
 
The way that it’s been setup – the offenders that have gone on the register, 
they’re the ones that don’t comply with the legislation and have committed 
further sex offences. So 90% of the people that we meet, they’re not affected 
by it. The offenders that aren’t on it are really relieved that they’re not. The 
lower grade offenders are the ones that were really, really worried about 
being on there. A lot of them are fathers or they’ve got what you’d call a 
‘family lifestyle’ and the shame of having their face published on a website 
saying that they’re a child sex offender would’ve…been too much for some 
of them. I think a lot of them would’ve been at risk of suicide and those sorts 
of things. (P10)  
The longer-term impact of the scheme on offenders’ psychological wellbeing 
was generally perceived to be limited. A key theme that emerged from the analysis 
was that the introduction of the scheme had not resulted in many of the adverse 
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consequences that the police had anticipated. It is probable that their expectations 
were founded on the evidence from the US, where community notification is much 
more widespread and intrusive. A consistent finding of this body of research is that 
community notification adversely impacts offenders’ psychological wellbeing (see 
Whitting, Day, & Powell, 2014 for a review of this literature). The perception that 
the scheme has had a limited long-term impact on offenders appeared to challenge 
some participants’ preconceived notions about the scheme.  
[The impact on offenders] wasn’t as bad as I envisaged. It destabilised 
[offenders], without a doubt. A lot of them were almost panic-struck. A lot of 
them were starting to go into depression, and there’s a precursor [to 
offending]. It did have that effect. But now that it’s up and running and it 
hasn’t had the impact upon them that they thought – that we thought as well – 
I’ll have to reassess…It definitely did increase their risk. But now that it sort 
of seems to have blown over – it wasn’t as bad, I suppose, as what we 
thought – as I thought. (P19)  
To the knowledge of participants, no offenders had followed through with 
threats of suicide and none of those who were apparently planning to close their 
business down went ahead with this (although it is unclear if any of these offenders 
were actually subject to notification). As predicted, a small number of offenders 
reportedly did move interstate around the time of the scheme’s introduction, although 
by all accounts this appeared to be pre-emptive rather than reactive, and many who 
voiced an intention to move prior to the implementation of the scheme did not carry 
through with this.   
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[The impact on offenders] was nothing like what I first anticipated…We had 
two or three [offenders] in a row headed off [interstate] but they were 
between medium and low risk offenders anyway – they were unlikely to have 
been published on the public sex offender register; they were just a bit 
paranoid about it. But those who have been published, I’ve been quite 
surprised that even though some of them probably keep to themselves a little 
bit more, the frantic changing of addresses and going underground, changing 
their names and god only knows what else, just didn’t eventuate. (P19) 
One rather obvious explanation for the smaller-than-anticipated impact on 
offenders is that so few offenders are in fact subject to notification under the current 
scheme. However, there was a perception that even those subject to notification were 
either “quite accepting of it” (P15) or seemingly apathetic towards it. As one 
participant (P10) put it, “they [those subject to notification] kind of shrugged it off”. 
Another (P18) reflected, “I think some of them are quite blasé about it…As the time 
has gone on, the ones that are on the register seem to have just relaxed and gotten 
into the flow and not really given it a second thought”. 
From the perspective of the police, the scheme has had on the whole a limited 
long-term impact on offenders. It would appear that the distress and anxiety 
experienced by offenders prior to the scheme’s implementation arose from 
misinformation and misconceptions about the nature of the scheme and largely 
dissipated following its implementation. 
 
Have there been any incidents of vigilantism linked to the scheme?  
From the perspective of the police officers interviewed, a major source of 
offenders’ anxiety surrounding the introduction of the scheme was fear of 
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vigilantism; a concern shared by the police. Some offenders reportedly drastically 
changed their appearance around the time the scheme came into effect, presumably 
out of fear they would be targeted by vigilantes. However, contrary to both police 
and offender expectations, no-one had been charged with vigilantism within the first 
10 months of the scheme’s operation (at the time that the final interviews were 
conducted). 
All but two of the police officers interviewed were not aware of any instances 
of vigilantism linked to the scheme. These participants viewed the fact that there had 
not been any incidents of vigilantism (at least not to their knowledge) as evidence 
that the safeguards that had been put in place to minimise the risk of vigilantism 
were effective. These safeguards include the enactment of legislation criminalising 
vigilantism and creation of two different vigilante offences; the requirement that one 
must verify their identity in order to perform a local search; watermarking digital 
photographs of offenders with the full name of the user who performed the search 
(enabling the source of illegally reproduced photographs to be traced); and ensuring 
that all offenders subject to notification pursuant to tier two have an ‘extraction plan’ 
in place, to be followed in the event of a vigilante attack. 
One participant (P21) reported that an offender who was subject to 
notification pursuant to tier two was forced to relocate as local residents were 
“making an issue” outside his house and “got a bit carried away”. Another 
participant (P15) recalled that an associate of an offender discovered a letter 
addressed to the offender notifying him that he would be subject to notification and 
subsequently disseminated material to local residents informing them of such. It 
should be noted, however, that neither of these alleged incidents of vigilantism led to 
any charges being laid and, as such, it was not possible to verify these accounts. 
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A subsequent search of the agency’s internal evidence briefs system revealed 
that only one individual had been charged with a vigilante offence as at 27 February 
2015. This followed an investigation into two people who allegedly posted 
photographs that were obtained through performing a local search to a public 
Facebook page. Charges were subsequently laid against one person who was 
originally charged with engaging in conduct intended to create, promote or increase 
animosity towards, or harassment of, an identified offender – the more serious of the 
two available vigilante offences, carrying a maximum penalty of 10 years’ 
imprisonment. However, this charge was downgraded to the lesser offence at the trial 
and the person was found guilty of engaging in conduct that is likely to create, 
promote or increase animosity towards, or harassment of, an identified offender, 
which carries a maximum penalty of two years’ imprisonment. 
In summary, it would appear that the safeguards that were put in place to 
minimise the risk of vigilantism have been effective, as only one person was charged 
with vigilantism in the first 29 months of the scheme’s operation.    
 
Has the introduction of the scheme had an impact on offenders’ compliance 
with their reporting obligations?  
A key concern reported by Whitting et al. (2016) was that the introduction of 
the scheme would lead to offenders going underground. This concern does not 
appear to have come to fruition. On the contrary, there was a perception among those 
interviewed that the introduction of the scheme had improved compliance, at least 
among some offenders. A few offenders who had failed to report and whose 
whereabouts were unknown reportedly “surrendered” themselves to police upon 
being published on the missing offenders register. It emerged that many officers have 
	 94 
capitalised on offenders’ apparent fear of notification by using the threat of 
notification as a means of ensuring compliance. Anecdotal evidence was cited 
suggesting that the mere threat of publishing offenders’ details on the register 
encouraged them to report to police. For example, one participant recalled that an 
offender who had failed to report and whose whereabouts was unknown telephoned 
the police within half an hour of his mother being advised that his details would be 
published on the register. 
It has developed into a tool that we have manipulated to be able to be useful 
to us. We have offenders…that are not being managed because they’ve gone 
underground, and those people will return to their normal way of life, which 
is high risk because they offended under those circumstances before. They’ve 
been identified. Some of them because they’ve been named, have come and 
handed themselves in. Any offender that is brought back under the fold is an 
advantage to the community. (P19)  
 
It’s not that you use it as a threat, but it’s a fact that you can say [to 
offenders], ‘Well, if you don’t take [your obligations] seriously there is a 
chance you could end up on [the register].’ And that’s the reality; it’s not an 
inducement or anything like that…So they’re definitely wary. (P12) 
It was, however, noted that this approach was not effective in gaining compliance 
among all offenders, such as Indigenous offenders living in remote areas without 
Internet access, those with intellectual disabilities or substance abuse problems, or 
those evading the police because they have outstanding warrants for their arrest. 
The primary dataset described in the Method section was then interrogated in 
order to analyse compliance for the purposes of methodological triangulation (see 
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Denzin, 1978; Patton, 1999). An independent-samples approach was considered to 
have fewer limitations than a paired-samples approach (see below for a discussion of 
the limitations of the chosen approach). The first cohort consisted of all those who 
became a reportable offender between 14 October 2007 and 14 October 2009 (n = 
414), whilst the second cohort comprised all those who became a reportable offender 
between 14 October 2010 and 14 October 2012 (n = 454). The proportion of 
offenders in each cohort convicted of failing to comply with their reporting 
obligations40 in the 18-month period commencing 15 October 2009 (pre-notification 
group) or 15 October 2012 (post-notification group) was compared. Those in the pre-
notification group had been registered as a reportable offender for, on average, 382 
days, whilst those in the post-notification group had been registered for an average of 
379 days at the commencement of the relevant period (15 October 2009 and 15 
October 2012 for the pre- and post-notification group, respectively). This difference 
was not statistically significant. 
Of those in the pre-notification group, 9.18% had at least one violation (M = 
0.16; SD = 0.60; range = 5.00), whereas 13.44% of those in the post-notification 
group had at least one violation (M = 0.28; SD = 0.98; range = 11.00). Table 3 
provides the distribution of violations for each group. A Mann-Whitney test was 
conducted in order to test whether the difference between the groups was significant. 
The Mann-Whitney test was selected on the basis that Levene’s test of homogeneity 
of variance indicated that the variances were unequal, F(1, 866) = 16.86, p < .001. 
This revealed that the post-notification group had a significantly greater number of 
violations than the pre-notification group, U = 89,868.50, z = -2.02, p = .04, r = -.07.  
																																																						
40There are in fact four different offence types that relate to failure to comply with the legislative 
requirements pertaining to reportable offenders. However, due to the low overall number of 
violations, these four offence types were combined for the purposes of data analysis, and only the 
totals are provided.      
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The evidence in relation to the scheme’s impact on offenders’ compliance is 
mixed. The police perceived that the scheme had led to improved compliance, at 
least among some offenders. However, the quantitative analysis of compliance 
revealed a slight overall increase in non-compliance following the scheme’s 
implementation, although the effect size was small.   
 
Table 3  
Frequency (%) of Violations for Each Group  
Number of violations 
Pre-notification group  
(n = 414) 
Post-notification group 
(n = 454) 
0 376 (90.8%) 393 (86.6%) 
1 22 (5.3%) 31 (6.8%) 
2 10 (2.4%) 14 (3.1%) 
3 1 (0.2%) 9 (2.0%) 
4 4 (1.0%) 3 (0.7%) 
5 1 (0.2%) 2 (0.4%) 
9 - 1 (0.2%) 
11 - 1 (0.2%) 
M (SD) 0.16 (0.60) 0.28 (0.98) 
Mdn 0.00 0.00 
 
Discussion 
 
 Taken together, the findings of this study suggest that the major concerns 
expressed by the police officers responsible for administering the notification scheme 
have not, for the most part, come to fruition. One of the key concerns reported by 
Whitting et al. (2016) was that the scheme would significantly increase the workload 
of police. Whilst it was evidently resource-intensive to implement, the workload 
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associated with the ongoing operation of the scheme was considered manageable. 
With the exception of two staff members in dedicated roles, the scheme appears to 
have had a minimal impact on the day-to-day workload of staff. 
The scheme also does not appear to have had the adverse impact on offenders 
that was anticipated, although it is important to acknowledge that this conclusion is 
based only on the perspectives of those police officers who were interviewed. It is 
possible that this group was either not aware of the full extent of the impact of the 
scheme on offenders or minimised its impact. Furthermore, it should be borne in 
mind that no tier three disclosures had been made at the time the interviews were 
conducted. Examination of the tier three applications that had been received revealed 
that in six of the eight cases, the person of interest was an immediate or extended 
family member. A disclosure made under such circumstances would be likely to 
have a significant impact on the offender and could foreseeably result in the 
breakdown of relationships, loss of contact with the child or children concerned, and 
potentially a change in living arrangements. The impact of the scheme on offenders 
who are the subject of a tier three disclosure remains to be seen and should be 
carefully monitored.  
Offenders’ perceptions of the impact of the scheme were not considered in 
this study and this would be a useful direction for future research. Such a study could 
reveal, for example, that the true incidence of vigilantism is higher than that reported 
here. At the time of writing, only one person had been charged with vigilantism and 
it is quite possible that many such occurrences go unreported or do not proceed to the 
investigation or prosecution stages. Indeed, the fact that two participants were aware 
of two separate incidents of vigilantism, neither of which resulted in charges being 
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laid, suggests that the incidence of vigilantism is indeed higher than is reflected in 
official records. 
One explanation that could account for the scheme’s smaller than anticipated 
impact is that participants’ expectations were shaped by the experience in the US, 
where notification is much more widespread and intrusive. Although the US laws 
were originally intended to target high-risk sex offenders, the purpose and scope of 
these laws has expanded over time and the number of offenders subject to 
notification has grown exponentially (Appelbaum, 2008; Center for Sex Offender 
Management, 2008; Logan, 2011; Thompson & Greek, 2010). Indeed, a common 
criticism of community notification laws, and indeed other legislative measures 
targeting sex offenders, is that they are overly-inclusive and many commentators 
have argued that targeting these laws to higher risk offenders – as was the original 
intent – would be a more efficient use of limited resources and at the same time 
mitigate some of the negative consequences experienced by lower risk offenders 
(Cohen & Jeglic, 2007; Duwe & Donnay, 2008; Lasher & McGrath, 2012; Levenson 
& Cotter, 2005; Levenson et al., 2007; Prescott & Rockoff, 2011; Vess et al., 2011). 
Evaluations of tiered notification systems which discriminate on the basis of 
risk have generally reported more favourable outcomes than evaluations of systems 
that operate within a ‘one size fits all’ framework (Barnoski, 2005; Lasher & 
McGrath, 2012). In one of only a few studies to have concluded that notification has 
a specific deterrent effect, Duwe and Donnay (2008) compared the recidivism rate of 
a sample of offenders subject to notification in Minnesota, where offenders are 
assigned a risk level prior to their release from prison and only those deemed to be 
high risk are subject to broad public notification, with two separate matched control 
groups. They concluded that notification significantly reduced sexual recidivism but 
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cautioned against subjecting low and moderate risk offenders to broad notification, 
asserting that doing so “would not likely produce an appreciable reduction in sexual 
recidivism given that the baseline rate for these offenders is already relatively low” 
(p. 443). It is of interest that offenders have themselves suggested that public sex 
offender registers would be more effective if they differentiated between different 
types of offenders and the relative risk they pose (Tewksbury & Lees, 2007). 
The tier two eligibility criteria specifically target those legally designated as 
‘Dangerous Sexual Offenders’, recidivist offenders, and those who have committed a 
serious offence and are deemed to pose a risk to the community (this third category 
is assessed on a case-by-case basis and requires Ministerial approval). At the time of 
writing, less than 5% of all reportable offenders had been subject to any form of 
notification. The analysis indicated that those subject to notification were higher risk 
than those not subject to notification, as evidenced by higher levels of risk according 
to the RM2000 (Thornton et al., 2003), and a longer length of registration, which can 
be considered a proxy for risk, given that more serious classes of offences and 
recidivistic offences attract longer registration periods. Although this finding 
suggests that the scheme is focussed on high-risk offenders, it should be noted that a 
sizeable proportion of those subject to notification – over half of those subject to tier 
one and almost one-quarter of those subject to tier two notification – were classified 
as low or moderate risk. 
The analysis also revealed that Indigenous offenders were more likely to be 
subject to both tier one and tier two notification. This finding is of significance, 
particularly when considered in the context of the police perception that the threat of 
notification is less effective for Indigenous offenders living in rural and remote areas. 
Further to this, it is noteworthy that participants perceived that the introduction of the 
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scheme had improved compliance among some offenders but not others. It is 
possible that a decrease in compliance among a subset of offenders masked an 
improvement in compliance among another subset of offenders. Unfortunately, it 
was not feasible to compare subgroups of offenders due to the relatively low number 
of offenders with violations. Furthermore, there are several caveats that deserve 
mention that limit the conclusions that can be drawn from the analysis.  
Firstly, it was not possible to study compliance over a longer period due to 
the fact that the scheme had only been in effect for less than two years at the time of 
the data extraction. Secondly, it is probable that some violations committed in the 
post-notification period did not have a court outcome at the time the data were 
extracted, which was approximately four months after the cut-off for the relevant 
period (15 October 2012 – 15 April 2014), and thus would not have been captured in 
the dataset. As such, it is likely that the post-notification group committed a greater 
number of violations than that reported. However, this would not change the 
direction of the relationship, but rather strengthen the finding that notification was 
associated with an overall decrease in compliance. Thirdly, there was no way of 
identifying in the dataset if an offender was reincarcerated during the relevant period. 
As such, it was not possible to control for opportunity to commit violations (as only 
those under community supervision can be charged with such offences). Finally, 
perhaps the most significant limitation is that the approach taken does not allow 
inferences to be drawn regarding causation and the possibility cannot be excluded 
that the observed decrease in compliance is attributable to unmeasured differences 
between the two groups or changes in policy or practice that are unrelated to the 
introduction of the scheme. 
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Notwithstanding these caveats, this study represents the first attempt to 
analyse the impact of the scheme. There is a clear need for further research and more 
nuanced analysis that attempts to identify the conditions under which notification is 
or is not effective, as global statements regarding the effectiveness of the scheme are 
unlikely to be all that informative. Indeed, the findings tentatively suggest that a ‘one 
size fits all’ approach may limit the effectiveness of the policy, and point to the need 
for more individualised responses and flexible application of the policy. Although 
the results of this study are somewhat encouraging insofar as they indicate that the 
introduction of the scheme has not resulted in many of the negative consequences 
anticipated, they also do not provide compelling evidence that it has had any 
observable positive effects. In light of this and the evident costs involved – both 
fiscal and human – in implementing such schemes, it would perhaps be prudent for 
other jurisdictions to carefully consider their overall benefits before proceeding 
further. 
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CHAPTER 5: GENERAL DISCUSSION 
  
The overarching aim of this thesis was to examine the perceptions and 
experiences of those police officers who are responsible for administering the first – 
and currently only – community notification scheme in Australasia. There are three 
key interrelated reasons research of this type is important. Firstly, there has been no 
previous research that has investigated the implementation of the scheme from a 
policing perspective. In fact, to date, there has been only one other published study 
relating to the scheme – an online survey of members of the public who accessed the 
Community Protection Website (see Taylor et al., 2014; Chapter 3). Secondly, 
although U.S. and U.K. models of community notification informed the development 
of the new policy, the three-tiered design and the particulars of the scheme are 
unique. Thirdly, the legislative framework and the socio-political and cultural 
landscape within which this policy is embedded differs in many respects to the 
context in which similar schemes operate internationally. For these reasons, it cannot 
be assumed that the results of evaluations of similar schemes operating in other 
countries can be generalised to the Australian context. This research is also timely 
given the interest of other Australian jurisdictions, and in New Zealand, of adopting 
similar legislation. 
The aim of the first empirical study was to explore police officers’ 
expectations and concerns in relation to the introduction of the scheme. The analysis 
revealed that police were concerned that the policy would not achieve its intended 
objectives, and that it could potentially adversely impact offenders, the community at 
large, and/or the police agency. These concerns are broadly consistent with those 
documented in previous research, most of which emanates from the US (e.g., Farkas 
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& Zevitz, 2000; Gaines, 2006; Government Accountability Office, 2013; Harris, 
Levenson, Lobanov-Rostovsky, & Walfield, 2016; Harris, Lobanov-Rostovsky, & 
Levenson, 2015; Tewksbury & Mustaine, 2013; Walker & Ervin-McLarty, 2000).  
 The aim of the second empirical study was to investigate whether the main 
concerns identified in the first study had, in fact, been realised. The analysis 
indicated that many of the concerns held by the police officers interviewed had not 
come to fruition. The finding that the scheme had had a more limited impact than 
participants anticipated is likely attributable to two main factors. Firstly, that 
participants’ expectations were shaped by the experience in the US, where 
notification is much more widespread and intrusive. The design of the Australian 
scheme is less restrictive insofar as only a small proportion of reportable offenders 
are subject to notification. In the period 15 October 2012 (when the scheme came 
into effect) to 27 February 2015, 121 offenders were subject to (or potentially subject 
to) any form of notification, which represents less than 5% of the population of 
reportable offenders. Secondly, the number of enquiries and applications received 
during this period was reported to be less than that which was projected. It is 
noteworthy that evaluations of both the English (see Kemshall & Wood, 2010; see 
also Kemshall et al., 2012) and the Scottish (see Chan et al., 2010) pilot schemes 
reported similar findings, and this trend continued following the scheme’s national 
roll-out (Kemshall & Weaver, 2012). Kemshall and Weaver (2012) discuss how this 
reflects value for money when they note that: 
From an operational perspective, low numbers of enquiries and low 
conversion at application and disclosure stages increases costs per disclosure 
which requires to be measured against the value added by the scheme to 
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extant measures of child and public protection, in relation to the effective use 
of scarce resources. (p. 555) 
In the first 28 months of its operation, the Australian scheme led to only one 
disclosure under the remit of the disclosure scheme (i.e., tier 3). This can be weighed 
against the cost of implementing the scheme, which was reported to be $2.9 million 
(Government of Western Australia, 2012; Spagnolo, 2011a). Whilst some 
stakeholders might consider this to reflect success, others might regard it as a failure. 
A common refrain in the discourse surrounding community notification policy, and 
indeed sex offender public policy more generally, is that these laws are justified “if 
one child is saved” (Logan, 2011, p. 235). The former Western Australian (W.A.) 
Police Minister, Rob Johnson, espoused this view when he declared, “if this public 
register leads to one less child being sexually abused, it will have served its purpose” 
(Spagnolo, 2011a, para. 9). The parents of the 8-year-old girl whose murder served 
as a catalyst for the passage of this legislation have also voiced similar comments 
(Spagnolo, 2011a). For others, however, the government could have instead invested 
these funds into an evidence-based programme or intervention that has the potential 
for greater or more certain (or simply more readily quantifiable) returns. 
It may simply be, as Bierie (2016) suggests, that lawmakers, professionals 
who work with sex offenders, researchers, and the public hold different views 
regarding what constitutes a “success,” and how “effectiveness” should be defined 
and operationalised. Although Bierie’s focus is on sex offender registration, his 
argument applies equally to community notification policies. He suggests that:  
It may be that proponents see a different standard or goal for judging 
registration policy as evidence based than found among typical social science 
paradigms. Opponents of the registry use methodology and arguments which 
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assume a policy must work all the time, or most of the time, in order to have 
value. Proponents are likely more interested in whether it is occasionally or 
ever useful in reducing sex crimes or assisting law enforcement 
investigations. (p. 265) 
He further notes that in appraising the utility of such schemes, it is important to 
distinguish between the question of whether they have a statistically significant 
effect on (re)offending – which will be of interest to researchers but perhaps not to 
other stakeholders – and whether they help occasionally or ever – which may be of 
greater interest to some other stakeholders. Whilst this distinction is useful, there are 
a number of factors which make it difficult to establish statistical significance in 
relation to questions of effectiveness. These factors include the lack of an appropriate 
comparison group, the low base rate of re-offending, the under-reporting of sex 
crimes, and the difficulties associated with disentangling the effects of notification 
with those of registration and other policy measures. Furthermore, evaluations are 
typically undertaken after the policy has already been implemented and thus rely on 
retrospective data. On account of these factors, the quality of the available evidence 
will rarely meet the standard that would be expected in other realms of science. For 
example, the randomised control trial – which is generally considered to be the “gold 
standard” of evidence within the field of psychology – is simply not feasible, nor is it 
ethical, in this context. In light of this, there is a need for other types of “evidence.” 
 Pawson’s (2006b; see also Pawson, 2003; 2006a) realist approach was 
developed to address some of the limitations of the traditional scientific research 
paradigm when applied to social policy. From a realist perspective, the primary 
objective of evaluation research is explanation-building. According to this approach, 
“the overall intention is to create an abstract model of how and why programmes 
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work, which then can be used to provide advice on the implementation and targeting 
of any novel incarnation of the intervention” (Pawson, 2006b, p. 74). Pawson argues 
that the success of social programmes is typically dependent on contextual factors 
and the structures and systems within which the programme is embedded. As such, 
the “same” programme or intervention is unlikely to be equally effective under all 
circumstances or conditions. In light of this, unconditional and global appraisals of 
the efficacy of a programme or intervention may not be particularly helpful or 
meaningful, and evaluation research should attempt instead to address the question, 
“what works for whom in what circumstances and in what respects?” (Pawson, 
2006b, p. 178). 
 The inconsistent and inconclusive results of multisite studies and systematic 
reviews of the effectiveness of community notification discussed in Chapter 2 point 
to the futility of global evaluations of effectiveness. There appears to be growing 
recognition of this among the research community. Stout et al. (2011), for example, 
have suggested that the framing of the debate around community notification has led 
to polarised views because it has tended to focus on the broader issue of whether or 
not it should be introduced, rather than discussion about the wide range of policies 
and practices that community notification encapsulates in practice. These authors 
explored stakeholder perceptions of the limited disclosure schemes in the UK, 
finding that children’s charities became more favourably disposed to disclosure 
following the pilot scheme. They concluded that the characteristics of a particular 
scheme, and the way in which it is framed and implemented, will determine whether 
it garners support and, ultimately, achieves its objectives. Harris and colleagues have 
also noted that there is significant variability in the way in which sex offender 
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registration and notification policies have been implemented in the US and also 
recognised the importance of contextual factors. Harris et al. (2016) assert that: 
The aim…is to move beyond an assessment of aggregate level impacts 
toward a broader understanding of the operational context [emphasis in 
original] through which the policies are implemented and utilised, as well as 
the system characteristics [emphasis in original] associated with more 
effective or less effective registries. (p. 5) 
The general principles of Pawson’s (2006a) realist approach to evaluation are thus 
useful when considering the potential implications of this research.  
 
Contribution, Implications and Recommendations  
 The primary value of this type of research lies in its potential to inform the 
effective design and implementation of community notification in similar 
jurisdictions. In Australia, there is interest among other states and at the federal level 
in introducing similar schemes ("Federal government resisting internal pressure," 
2014; Viellaris, 2013). To illustrate, when speaking to the press after a bill to 
introduce a public sex offender register was voted down in Queensland Parliament, 
the then Police Minister, Jack Dempsey, stressed the need for evidence-based policy 
and noted that whilst there was not enough evidence to support a public register of 
the kind that was proposed, he would be closely monitoring the WA scheme 
(Rebgetz & Agius, 2014). The police officers interviewed in this research were 
uniquely placed to comment on the way in which the scheme was framed and 
implemented and their perspectives might ultimately be of interest to police ministers 
and other policymakers around the country.  
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 Implications for policy. This research provides some preliminary data that 
addresses the “for whom” component of the aforementioned question posed by 
Pawson (2006b), which is concerned with the optimal targeting of an intervention. 
Although the overall majority of those who were subject to notification were 
classified as high or very high risk, it is noteworthy that a sizeable proportion were 
low or moderate risk offenders (over half of those subject to tier 1 notification and 
around one-quarter of those subject to tier 2 notification). This finding is inconsistent 
with current advice disseminated by the Center for Sex Offender Management 
([CSOM] 2008), the Association for the Treatment of Sexual Abusers ([ATSA] 
2008, 2010) and others (Blasko, Jeglic, & Mercado, 2011; Lasher & McGrath, 2012; 
Levenson & Cotter, 2005; Levenson, D’Amora, et al., 2007; Prescott & Rockoff, 
2011; Vess et al., 2011) that notification should be reserved for higher risk offenders. 
The implication here relates to the ideal breadth of the scheme.  
 The police officers interviewed in these studies believed that the scheme 
would effectively deter some offenders but not others. They further reported that 
many offenders were highly anxious and concerned about the prospect of their 
details being published on the register. It seems reasonable to assume that concern on 
the part of offenders would be a necessary, but not sufficient, prerequisite for 
notification to act as an effective deterrent. However, it is significant that there was a 
perception among participants that those who seemed most concerned about 
notification were those who were not subject to the policy. Around 80% of those not 
subject to notification were low or moderate risk. Duwe and Donnay (2008) note that 
notification is unlikely to lead to an appreciable reduction in recidivism among such 
offenders given that they have a relatively low rate of re-offending without any form 
of post-sentence intervention. This suggests, perhaps, that the introduction of the 
	109 
scheme and the prospect of notification could heighten anxiety among many 
offenders who otherwise would have been unlikely to re-offend, potentially 
(inadvertently) increasing their risk. Conversely, participants identified that some 
offenders who were subject to notification appeared to be indifferent or nonchalant 
about the scheme, which suggests that it may not act as an effective deterrent for 
these offenders.  
Further research is needed to identify the characteristics of offenders that 
influence the extent to which notification is likely to be an effective deterrent. 
Participants identified some salient preliminary considerations – for example, that 
notification may be less likely to be effective with Indigenous offenders who live in 
communities with limited availability of computers or internet access, those who 
have an intellectual impairment or substance use disorder that affects their capacity 
to comprehend the implications of notification, and those without friends or strong 
ties to the community (presumably because such individuals may have less to lose if 
they are outed by the community). Of note, at least one of these factors – the 
availability of computers or other devices with internet access – may also have an 
impact on the community’s capacity to engage in active monitoring and surveillance 
of offenders, which is an alternative mechanism through which community 
notification has been proposed to improve community safety. Further research is also 
needed to distil the individual characteristics or perhaps the constellation of factors 
that might be associated with an increased risk of recidivism among those subject to 
notification.  
 These findings, taken together, suggest that those involved with the 
implementation of the scheme are cautious about the potential to produce an 
appreciable reduction in recidivism. Whilst it is recognised that there is a need for 
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other types of evidence, the value of practice-based wisdom of police should not be 
overlooked and should inform the development of policy in this area.  
 Implications for practice. As noted above, the police officers who were 
interviewed reported that many offenders were highly anxious about the introduction 
of the scheme and the possibility that their details would be published. Concern was 
expressed that the heightened anxiety and stress experienced by offenders might 
increase their risk of re-offending. However, in practice, the scheme was seen as 
having very little impact on the vast majority of offenders. It is suggested, therefore, 
that offenders are provided with detailed (but easy to comprehend) information well 
ahead of the implementation of any new scheme. A question and answer type 
factsheet may be an effective means of conveying this information to offenders and 
could also direct them to appropriate support services available in the community. 
This might serve to allay anxieties and minimise the risk of adverse consequences. 
 Participants in these studies speculated that media misreporting contributed to 
offenders’ anxiety surrounding the introduction of the scheme. Similar factsheets to 
those produced for offenders could also be disseminated to professionals within the 
media industry. This could help to ensure that the public are provided with accurate 
information regarding the purpose of the scheme and how it works. Consistent with 
prior research, two opposing – but not mutually exclusive – concerns that emerged 
from the interviews with police were that: a) the scheme could lead to increased fear 
and panic; or b) create a false sense of security within the community. The 
introduction of community notification presents a valuable opportunity to inform and 
educate the public and dispel common myths about sexual abuse (ATSA, 2010; 
CSOM, 2001). Other jurisdictions planning to implement similar schemes might 
consider rolling out a broader public education campaign to coincide with the 
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introduction of community notification, as has been successfully piloted in the UK 
(Collins & Fildes-Moss, 2009).  
 
Limitations and Directions for Future Research  
 It is perhaps important to reiterate that this thesis does not represent an 
outcome evaluation of the community notification scheme. This was not feasible due 
to the limited outcome data available at the time the research was undertaken; 
therefore, this research should be viewed as focused on implementation issues and 
practitioner perspectives and thus a starting point from which to guide future 
research and evaluation. Although limited in scope, research of this type can be 
regarded as a prerequisite to outcome evaluation. Indeed, Pawson’s (2006b) realist 
approach to evaluation places central importance on the mechanisms of change as 
well as the contextual conditions within which a programme or intervention is 
embedded. As Pawson notes, “the crucial evidence is…to be found in terms of 
outcomes and [emphasis in original] mechanisms and [emphasis in original] 
contexts” (p. 25). This research offers some insights into the mechanisms, contexts 
and outcomes; however, there is much more work to be done.  
 Perhaps the overriding limitation of this research is that it offers only one 
perspective – that of police officers who are responsible for administering the 
scheme – and is necessarily biased. Garnering the perspectives of other stakeholders 
would lead to a fuller understanding of the perceived utility and impact of the 
scheme. It would be particularly worthwhile to also examine the views of offenders 
who have been subject to notification pursuant to each tier, other professionals who 
work with sex offenders, and members of the general public who have not accessed 
the website (Taylor et al., 2014, surveyed members of the public who had; see 
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Chapter 3). Furthermore, interviews with individuals who have submitted a tier three 
application would be fruitful as Taylor et al.’s study was very broad and did not 
specifically address this component of the scheme. Such a study might usefully 
explore applicants’ motivations for submitting an application and their satisfaction 
with the process.  
 Unfortunately, as is often the case with social policy evaluation research (see 
Pawson, 2006b), the interviews were undertaken after the policy had already been 
implemented, with the majority of the interviews being conducted approximately six 
months after the scheme had come into effect. It would have been advantageous to 
conduct interviews at two separate time points pre- and post-implementation; 
however, unfortunately, the necessary approval was not received prior to the 
scheme’s implementation. In light of this, a decision was made to undertake two 
separate, independent systematic thematic analyses using the same interview data. 
The initial analysis concentrated on identifying and coding participants’ expectations 
and concerns – what they anticipated would occur – whilst the focus of the latter 
analysis was on participants’ perceptions and observations of the impact of the 
scheme – what actually occurred. Whilst it is recognised that this is less than ideal, it 
was considered important to differentiate between participants’ expectations and 
preconceptions and their actual implementation experiences. 
It should be noted that it would have been premature to draw any 
conclusions, even tentative ones, regarding the validity of some of the concerns 
identified by the police officers interviewed. Several participants explicitly 
commented that it was too early to say whether the introduction of the scheme had 
any impact on recidivism. Unfortunately, it was not feasible to investigate the impact 
on recidivism given the timeframes within which the research was completed. A 
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quasi-experimental outcome study comparing recidivism rates pre- and post-
implementation of the scheme would make a useful contribution to the literature 
here. Although a rigorous evaluation of longer-term impacts, particularly the impact 
of the scheme on recidivism and compliance, would be desirable, such an evaluation 
is unlikely to be conclusive. As noted above, there are a number of methodological 
challenges inherent in collecting this type of evidence which limit the conclusions 
that may be drawn. Community notification was introduced in the US a quarter of a 
century ago and still no definitive conclusions can be reached with respect to its 
impact on recidivism.  
More broadly, future research in this area should seek to identify how best to 
maximise effectiveness and what factors limit or hinder effectiveness. Pawson’s 
(2006b) realist approach to evaluation may provide a useful framework with which 
to design and interpret the findings of future research in this area. From this 
perspective, a goal of research synthesis is “to produce a general theory of the 
conditions that support and hinder the programme theory” (Pawson, 2006b, p. 95). 
The accumulation of further evidence will no doubt provide useful information to 
legislators and policymakers in weighing the potential benefits and drawbacks of this 
policy. At the same time, it is important to acknowledge that lawmakers have a range 
of considerations and viewpoints that they must take into account and it is clearly the 
case that public policy in this area historically has not been evidence-based. This is a 
highly politicised and emotionally charged area of public policy that historically has 
been strongly influenced by public opinion which is not always well-informed. This 
leads into what is perhaps the overall conclusion of this thesis – that the evidence is 
more likely to inform policymaking if the public is aware of the evidence – and this 
must begin with public education.    
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Appendix A: Description of the Scheme 
 
The following information is published on the Community Protection website50: 
 
About Community Protection  
 
The Community Protection Website provides any member of the public with access 
to photographs and certain information on Western Australia’s most dangerous and 
high risk sexual offenders. It will enable parents and guardians to make enquiries 
with Western Australia Police about any person who has unsupervised contact to 
their child or children. The website provides three tiers of information access to 
ensure that families and the public have information on known sex offenders, which 
will assist with the protection and safety of children and the community. The 
Community Protection Website will not publish the photograph, personal details or 
release any information of an offender who is under the age of 18 years.  
 
Tier 1: Missing Sex Offenders Non Compliant Reportable Offenders 
 
The first tier of publication, the Missing Offenders section, displays photographs and 
personal details of reportable offenders who have either failed to comply with their 
reporting obligations, provided false or misleading information to Police and whose 
location or whereabouts is not known to Police.  
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	139 
The purpose of this publication is to enhance public vigilance in order to help locate 
non-compliant reportable offenders. The publication details include a photograph, 
the full name, known aliases, date of birth and a physical description of the 
reportable offender. If you know or have seen these non-compliant reportable 
offenders and can provide any information to assist in locating them, please pass that 
information onto Police by contacting 131 444. The photograph and personal details 
of a reportable offender are removed from publication when the reportable offender 
is located or reports their current whereabouts to Police. 
 
Tier 2: Local Search for Dangerous and High Risk Offenders  
 
The second tier of publication, the Local Search, will display photographs of certain 
dangerous and high risk offenders that reside within the same suburb and adjoining 
suburbs as the requester. These offenders are dangerous sexual offenders, serious 
repeat reportable offenders and other persons whose details have been authorised for 
publication by the Minister for Police. This publication is primarily for the purposes 
of enhanced public awareness and safety. 
 
Tier 3: Community Protection Disclosure Scheme 
 
The third tier of publication, the Disclosure Scheme, will allow a parent or guardian 
of a child or children to inquire with Police whether a specific person, who has 
regular unsupervised contact with their child or children, is a reportable offender. 
The parent or guardian making the application must provide their full details, the 
child or children’s details, the identity of the person of interest and the level of 
	140 
contact that person has with the child or children. Police will assess the request and 
may disclose to the applicant whether or not the person of interest is a reportable 
offender. This information is provided to better place the parent or guardian in a 
position to take appropriate steps to safeguard their children if necessary. 
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Appendix B: Description of the Missing Offenders Register (Tier 1) 
 
The following information is published on the Community Protection website51:  
 
The Western Australia Government has stringent measures in place for managing 
missing sex offenders who reside in our community under the Community Protection 
(Offender Reporting) Act 2004 (the Act). The significant majority of reportable 
offenders are compliant with their reporting obligations under the Act. However 
some reportable offenders fail to comply with their reporting obligations, or provide 
false or misleading information to Police. Where these non compliant reportable 
offenders cannot be located by Police, their photograph and personal details may be 
published on the website to enhance community awareness and to assist in locating 
them. 
 
Please assist in locating missing sex offenders, whether they are in Western 
Australia, interstate or overseas. With your help we can work together as a 
community to protect our children. If you have seen these reportable offenders or 
have any information concerning their current whereabouts please do not approach 
them directly. Report your information to the Police by calling 131 444. Thank you 
for your help. 
 
Please be aware the Community Protection (Offender Reporting) Act 2004 provides 
that it is a criminal offence to misuse the information made publicly available by this 
website. Those found guilty of committing such an offence can be liable to up to 10 
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years imprisonment. It is an offence for any person to use the personal information or 
photographs to: 
• engage in any conduct that will create, promote or increase animosity toward 
or harassment of a person identified by this site, or 
• publish, distribute or display any photographs or personal information 
provided by this site without the prior written approval from the Minister for 
Police.  
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Appendix C: Description of the Local Search (Tier 2) 
 
The following information is published on the Community Protection website52: 
 
Performing a local search will provide the applicant with access to photographs of 
dangerous and high risk offenders residing in their locality. Only the photographs of 
offenders residing in an applicant’s suburb and the adjoining suburbs will be 
displayed. The offenders whose photographs will be displayed include either: 
• Dangerous sexual offenders subject to supervision orders under the 
Dangerous Sexual Offenders Act 2006; 
• Serious repeat reportable offenders; 
• Persons who have been convicted of an offence punishable by imprisonment 
for 5 years or more, and concern is held that this person poses a risk to the 
lives or sexual safety of one or more persons or persons generally. 
 
Access to this information is primarily for the purposes of enhanced public 
awareness and safety. 
 
Please be aware the Community Protection (Offender Reporting) Act 2004 provides 
that it is a criminal offence to misuse the information made publicly available by this 
website. Those found guilty of committing such an offence can be liable to up to 10 
years imprisonment. It is an offence for any person to use the published photographs 
to: 
• engage in any conduct that will create, promote or increase animosity toward 
																																																						
52 https://www.communityprotection.wa.gov.au/LocalSearch 
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or harassment of a person identified by this site; or 
• publish, distribute or display any photographs or personal information 
provided by this site without the prior written approval from the Minister for 
Police.  
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Appendix D: Description of the Disclosure Scheme (Tier 3) 
 
The following information is published on the Community Protection website53: 
 
The Community Protection Disclosure Scheme is available to any parent or guardian 
of a child or children. A parent or guardian can apply to the Commissioner of Police 
to be informed whether or not a person of interest, who has regular unsupervised 
contact with their child, is a reportable offender. No disclosure can be made about a 
reportable offender who is under the age of 18 years. 
 
The applicant will be required to provide their personal details, the details of the 
child or children and sufficient detail to identify the person of interest. The 
application must provide evidence to the satisfaction of the Commissioner that the 
person of interest has at least three days of unsupervised contact with the child or 
children in any twelve month period. The three days do not have to be consecutive. If 
the Commissioner of Police is satisfied that the person inquired about has regular 
unsupervised contact with a child of whom the applicant is a parent or guardian, the 
Commissioner may inform the applicant whether or not the person of interest is a 
reportable offender. 
 
This information is provided to better place the parent or guardian in a position to 
take appropriate steps to safeguard the child or children if necessary. In all instances 
disclosure is at the discretion of the Commissioner of Police. 
 
																																																						
53 https://www.communityprotection.wa.gov.au/DisclosureScheme 
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Where information is received by the Commissioner of Police that indicates a 
reportable offender may be in breach of their obligations under the Community 
Protection (Offender Reporting) Act 2004, WA Police will investigate and act 
accordingly. 
 
It is an offence to make a false application in an attempt to obtain information, which 
you do not have a lawful right to access. This offence is punishable by up to 7 years 
imprisonment. Anyone who makes an application for disclosure using false 
information or misuses information disclosed through this website, may be subject to 
prosecution. 
 
Concerned for Child Safety? 
 
If you are concerned for a child or children, there is a list of agencies that you can 
contact in Information Links on the website. If you are worried about the wellbeing 
or safety of a child or young person, you need to contact the Department for Child 
Protection at the district office closest to where the child lives or the Crisis Care Unit 
after hours. Talking to someone experienced in supporting families or in child 
protection can also help you decide what actions need to happen to keep the child or 
young person safe. 
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Appendix E: Disclosure Scheme (Tier 3) Application Form 
	
  
	148 
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Appendix F: Community Protection Website User Agreement 
 
The purpose of the Community Protection website is to ensure that families and 
communities have information on dangerous and high risk offenders, which will 
assist with the protection and safety of children and the community. 
 
By accessing this website and the information contained within it, you acknowledge 
and agree to the following conditions: 
• you will not create, promote or increase animosity toward or harassment of a 
person identified by this site; and 
• you will not publish, distribute or display any photographs or personal 
information provided by this site without the prior written approval from the 
Minister for Police. 
 
The Community Protection (Offender Reporting) Act 2004 (WA) provides that it is a 
criminal offence to misuse the information made publicly available by this website. 
Those found guilty of committing such an offence can be liable to up to 10 years 
imprisonment. 
 
If you agree to abide by these conditions please continue. If you do not agree to these 
conditions, please leave this website now. 
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Appendix G: Deakin University Human Research Ethics Committee 
Approval 
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Appendix I: Police Agency Approval Letter (Study 1) 
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Appendix J: Police Agency Approval Letter (Study 2) 
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Appendix K: Invitation to Prospective Participants  
 
	
	
		11	April	2013				Dear	staff,			
RE:	Invitation	to	participate	in	a	research	study		You	are	invited	to	take	part	in	a	research	study	being	conducted	by	Deakin	University.	This	study	is	part	of	a	program	of	research	that	aims	to	develop	a	model	of	sex	offender	registration,	monitoring,	and	risk	management.	We	are	interested	to	know	how	those	who	are	involved	in	the	management	of	sex	offenders	in	the	community	conceptualise	the	notion	of	risk,	and	how	this	influences	what	they	consider	to	be	effective	risk	management.	This	research	may	contribute	to	the	better	management	of	sex	offenders	in	the	future.			Participation	in	this	study	will	involve	taking	part	in	an	interview,	the	maximum	duration	of	which	will	be	45	minutes,	and	completing	a	short	questionnaire	that	should	not	take	any	more	than	five	minutes	to	complete.	Please	see	the	attached	Plain	Language	Statement	for	more	detailed	information	about	the	research	project.	Please	note	participation	in	this	study	is	completely	voluntary	and	your	relationship	with	your	employer	and/or	Deakin	University	will	not	be	affected	in	any	way	by	your	decision	to	participate	or	not	to	participate.	This	research	project	has	been	approved	by	the	Human	Research	Ethics	Committee	of	Deakin	University	and	will	be	carried	out	according	to	the	National	Statement	on	Ethical	
Conduct	in	Human	Research	(2007)	produced	by	the	National	Health	and	Medical	Research	Council	of	Australia.			I	will	be	scheduling	interviews	with	staff	between	9am	and	5.15pm	on	Monday	22	April	–	Wednesday	24	April	2013	(inclusive).		If	you	are	interested	in	taking	part	in	this	study,	please	contact	me	via	phone	XXXX	XXX	XXX	or	email	l.whitting@deakin.edu.au	to	arrange	an	interview	time.	If	you	are	interested	in	taking	part	but	are	unavailable	on	these	days,	a	telephone	interview	can	be	arranged	at	a	time	convenient	to	you.			Thank	you	for	your	consideration.	Please	do	not	hesitate	to	contact	me	if	you	have	any	queries	or	concerns	about	the	research.			Yours	sincerely,				
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Appendix L: Plain Language Statement and Consent Form 
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
			
			
PLAIN	LANGUAGE	STATEMENT	AND	CONSENT	FORM			
TO:		Potential	Participants			
	
Plain	Language	Statement	
	
Date:							 		 			 			 11/04/2013			
Full	Project	Title:					 A	Model	of	Sex	Offender	Registration,	Monitoring,	
and	Risk	Management		
Reference	Number:								 		 HEAG-H	100_2012		
	
Principal	Researchers:		 Prof		Andrew		Day,		Prof		Martine		Powell,		Prof		Joe			
	 	Graffam,		Dr		Sharon	Casey,		Prof	Ed	Carson			
Student	Researchers:					 Gaynor	Hobbs,		Laura	Whitting			
	
			
This	Plain	Language	Statement	and	Consent	Form	is	4	pages	long.	Please	make	
sure	you	read	all	the	pages.		
			
Your	Consent		
You	are	invited	to	take	part	in	this	research	project.	Please	read	this	Plain	Language	
Statement	carefully.	Feel	free	to	ask	questions	about	any	information	in	the	
document.	You	may	also	wish	to	discuss	the	project	with	a	friend	or	colleague.	This	
Plain	Language	Statement	contains	detailed	information	about	the	research	project.	
Its	purpose	is	to	explain	to	you	as	openly	and	clearly	as	possible	all	the	procedures	
involved	in	this	project	so	that	you	can	make	a	fully	informed	decision	whether	you	
would	like	to	participate.	If	you	agree	to	take	part,	you	will	be	asked	to	sign	the	
Consent	Form.	By	signing	the	Consent	Form,	you	indicate	that	you	understand	the	
information	and	that	you	give	your	consent	to	participate	in	the	research	project.	
You	will	be	given	a	copy	of	the	Plain	Language	Statement	and	Consent	Form	to	keep	
as	a	record.		
		
Purpose			
In	Australia,	recent	years	have	seen	significant	policy	changes	in	relation	to	the	
management	of	sexual	offenders.	Whilst	considerable	resources	have	been	
dedicated	to	the	implementation	of	registration	and	intensive	case	management	
schemes,	these	initiatives	have	not	previously	been	the	subject	of	systematic	
review,	and	it	is	not	clear	how	they	can	best	contribute	to	public	safety.	This	
research	will	draw	on	the	perspectives	of	those	who	are	involved	in	the	
management	of	offenders	in	the	community	to	develop	a	theoretical	basis	from	
which	to	inform	good	practice	in	offender	management	and	supervision	practices.	
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The	research	project	is	being	conducted	by	researchers	at	Deakin	University,	and	
two	student	researches	are	involved	with	the	project.		
	
Background			
The	aim	of	this	study	is	to	establish	how	practitioners	–	government	and	non-
government	services	providers	–	conceptualise	the	notion	of	risk,	and	how	this	
influences	what	they	consider	to	be	effective	risk	management.	This	study	will	be	
informed	by	a	review	of	the		
legislative	and	public	policy	basis	of	work	in	this	area,	but	have	a	primary	focus	on	
current	practice.	This	will	include	how	different	cases	are	prioritised,	the	nature	
and	quality	of	professional	interactions	with	registrants,	and	how	the	various	roles	
that	professionals	are	required	to	undertake	(e.g.,	rehabilitative,	monitoring	and	
surveillance,	and	crime	prevention)	might	be	balanced.	You	are	uniquely	placed	to	
contribute	to	an	understanding	of	risk,	and	yet	no	previous	research	has	sought	to	
investigate	and	document	the	knowledge	of	those	who	work	in	the	area.	It	is	well	
established	that	practice	wisdom	can	offer	valuable	insights	into	the	effectiveness	
of	a	particular	policy	or	program.		
		
Methods					
Taking	part	in	this	project	will	involve	you	answering	some	questions	about	how	
you	understand	risk	in	sex	offenders	and	how	this	influences	current	practice.	
The	interviews	will	be	either	face	to	face	or	over	the	telephone,	or	you	may	be	
asked	to	join	a	focus	group.		
	
	Potential	Benefits	and	Risks	to	Participants			
There	are	no	direct	benefits	from	taking	part	in	this	research	but	it	is	important	
to	know	that	no	one	will	be	individually	identified	in	the	research.	The	research	
may	contribute	to	the	better	management	of	sex	offenders	in	the	future.		
	
Privacy	and	Confidentiality			
The	interviews	will	be	audio	taped	in	order	to	ensure	that	what	is	said	is	
accurately	recorded.	If	you	are	invited	to	join	a	focus	group,	each	participant	will	
be	asked	to	respect	other	members	of	the	group	by	not	identifying	other	
participants	or	discussing	the	group	outside	of	the	meeting.	The	audio	tapes	will	
be	transcribed	and	each	participant	will	be	given	a	different	name	in	the	
transcript	to	protect	your	identity.	This	transcript	will	only	be	accessible	to	the	
researchers	via	a	password.	Once	the	transcript	is	completed	the	audio	files	will	
be	destroyed.		
Under	no	circumstances	will	the	identity	of	any	participant	in	this	research	be	
released	in	presentation	or	publication	of	the	project’s	results.		
	
Results		of		the		Project			
The	general	results	of	the	project	will	be	presented	in	a	thesis	by	the	student	
researchers	of	this	project	and	may	also	be	published	in	peer	reviewed	journals	
and	presented	at	conferences.	No	participants	will	be	identifiable	in	published	
or	presented	results.	A	short	summary	of	the	project	will	be	provided	to	you	if	
you	request	this.	This	option	is	available	in	the	Consent	Form.		
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How		the		Research		will		be		Monitored			
The	project’s	researchers	regularly	communicate	about	the	project	and	its	
progression.	Any	problems	with	the	project	will	be	monitored	and	discussed	by	the	
researchers	throughout	the	entire	project.	Any	changes	to	what	you	read	in	this	
information	statement	must	first	be	approved	by	a	stringent	ethical	process	that	
maintains	high	levels	of	ethical	responsibility	towards	participants	by	the	
researchers.		
	
Funding		
This	research	is	funded	by	the	Australian	Research	Council.	The	members	of	the	
research	team	do	not	have	any	affiliation	with	the	providers	of	funding	or	support,	
or	a	financial	interest	in	the	outcome	of	the	research.		
	
Participation	is	100%	Voluntary	
If	you	do	not	wish	to	take	part	in	this	research	you	do	not	have	to.	If	you	decide	to	
participate	and	later	change	your	mind,	you	are	free	to	withdraw	from	the	project	
at	any	stage,	even	in	the	middle	of	completing	a	study.	Any	information	obtained	
from	you	will	not	be	used	and	will	be	destroyed.		
Your	relationship	with	your	employer	and/or	Deakin	University	will	not	be	
affected	in	any	way	if	you	decide	to	participate,	not	to	participate,	or	withdraw	
your	participation	at	a	later	date.		
Before	you	make	your	decision,	you	might	have	some	questions.	Please	contact	
either	Andrew	Day	or	Laura	Whitting	whose	contact	details	are	below,	in	order	for	
all	your	questions	to	be	answered.	Sign	the	Consent	Form	only	after	you	have	had	
a	chance	to	ask	your	questions	and	received	satisfactory	answers.	If,	at	any	time,	
you	decide	to	withdraw	from	this	project,	please	notify	either	Andrew	Day	or	
Laura	Whitting	and	complete	and	return	the	“Withdrawal	of	Consent	Form”	
attached	to	this	document.		
	
Ethical	Guidelines	
This	project	will	be	carried	out	according	to	the	National	Statement	on	Ethical	
Conduct	in	Human	Research	(2007)	produced	by	the	National	Health	and	Medical	
Research	Council	of	Australia.	This	statement	has	been	developed	to	protect	the	
interests	of	people	who	agree	to	participate	in	human	research	studies.	The	ethics	
aspects	of	this	research	project	have	been	approved	by	the	Human	Research	
Ethics	Committee	of	Deakin	University.		
	
Further	Information,	Queries	or	Any	Problems		
If	you	require	further	information,	wish	to	withdraw	your	participation	or	if	you	
have	any	problems	concerning	this	project,	you	can	contact:		
	
Professor	Andrew	Day	
Telephone:	(03)		5227		8715					
Facsimile:		(03)		5227		8621			
Email:	andrew.day@deakin.edu.au	
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Laura	Whitting		
Doctor	of	Psychology	(Forensic)	Candidate		
Telephone:	XXXX	XXX	XXX		
Email:	l.whitting@deakin.edu.au		
	
Complaints		
If	you	have	any	complaints	about	any	aspect	of	the	project,	the	way	it	is	being	
conducted	or	any	questions	about	your	rights	as	a	research	participant,	then	you	
may	contact:	
	
The	Manager	
Research	Integrity		
Deakin	University		
221	Burwood	Highway	
Burwood,	VIC	3121		
Telephone:	(03)	9251	7129		
Facsimile:	(03)	9244	6581		
Email:	research-ethics@deakin.edu.au		
		
Please	quote		project		number		HEAG-H	100_2012.	
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PLAIN		LANGUAGE		STATEMENT		AND		CONSENT		FORM			
TO:		Participants					
			
	
Consent	Form		
	
Date:							 		 			 11/04/2013		
	
Full		Project		Title:			 A	Model	of	Sex	Offender	Registration,	Monitoring,	and		
Risk	Management		
	
Reference	Number:	 		HEAG-H	100_2012		 	
	
			
1. I		have		read		and		I		understand		the		attached		Plain		Language		Statement.			
2. I		freely		agree		to		participate		in		this		project		according		to		the		conditions		in		the							
Plain		Language		Statement.					
3. I		have		been		given		a		copy		of		the		Plain		Language		Statement		and		Consent		Form							
to		keep.					
4. The		researcher		has		agreed		not		to		reveal		my		identity		and		personal		details,																			
including		where		information		about		this		project		is		published,		or		presented		in										
any		public		form.							
	
		(								)		I		would		NOT		like		the		researchers		to		send		me		a		summary		of		the		results	of		this	
research.			
	
		(								)			I		would		like		the		researchers		to		send		me		a		summary		of		the		results	of		this															
research.		These		can		be		sent		via:					
	
		(										)		email;	my		email		address		is:			
	 	
				
		(										)		mail;		my		address		is:		
	 	
	
Participant’s		Name		(printed)		………………………………………………………………………………	
Signature		…………………………………………………………..			 Date				………………………………….			
			
Please	mail,	email,	or	hand	this	form	in	person	to:			
	
Laura	Whitting		
School		of		Psychology	
Deakin		University			
221		Burwood		Highway			
Burwood	,	VIC		3125			
			
Email:		l.whitting@deakin.edu.au		
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PLAIN		LANGUAGE		STATEMENT		AND		CONSENT		FORM			
TO:				Participants			
					
Withdrawal		of		Consent		Form			
	
Date:							 		 			 11/04/2013		
	
Full		Project		Title:			 A	Model	of	Sex	Offender	Registration,	Monitoring,	and		
	 Risk	Management		
	
Reference	Number:	 		HEAG-H	100_2012		 	
	
			
			
	
I		hereby		wish		to		WITHDRAW		my		consent		to		participate		in		the		above		research			
project		and		understand		that		such		withdrawal		WILL		NOT		jeopardise		my																													
relationship		with		Deakin		University		or		my		employer.			
	
			
			
			
Participant’s		Name		(printed)		……………………………………………………………………………		
	
Signature		…………………………………………………………..			 Date				……………………………….		
			
			
			
Please	mail,	email,	or	hand	this	form	in	person	to:			
	
Laura	Whitting		
School		of		Psychology	
Deakin		University			
221		Burwood		Highway			
Burwood	,	VIC		3125			
			
Email:		l.whitting@deakin.edu.au			
	
